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ABSTRACT 
 
The U.S. and U.K. attacks on the territory of Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 were not 
justified as a legal application of their inherent right to self-defense under international 
law. The attacks of 9/11 on the World Trade Center were not armed attacks by the State 
of Afghanistan; neither did the U.S. letter to the Security Council nor official documents 
and statements prove Taliban’s responsibility and effective control over al Qaeda’s 
terrorist operation on the U.S. soil. Even if the U.S. and U.K. invoked Article 51, 
considering 9/11 as armed attacks, the 7 October 2001 attacks on the territory of 
Afghanistan still did not satisfy customary law requirements of self-defense; necessity, 
proportionality, and immediacy. In addition, the U.S. and U.K. arguments  for 
anticipatory use of force in the face of imminent threats by Afghanistan were not 
supported by evidence to the Council. Moreover, both governments did not receive 
Security Council authorization to use force in self-defense when they attacked 
Afghanistan.   
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the major goals of the United Nations Charter is the regulation of States’ use of 
force. This major goal serves the overall  goal of the Charter, stated in its preamble, 
which is the maintenance of international peace and security between all States. To 
accomplish the UN Charter's main goal, States should act together, in good faith, to fulfill 
the obligations imposed by it. Of course the United States stands as one of the most 
dominant States in the international realm, and especially in the field of international law, 
as it is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. But did the United 
States in its international relations play down the rules imposed by the Charter in  good 
faith? Did it apply the Charter’s rule while using force in response to the attacks by 
terrorist groups? It might be the importance of the thesis.   
On September 11 2001, the United States was subject to one of the deadliest attacks in its 
history. Two flights, launched from a U.S. Northeast airport, were hijacked by terrorists 
and flown into the World Trade Center in the city of New York and the Pentagon in 
Washington, D.C. On the first speech to his people, the U.S. President accused the al 
Qaeda terrorist group of “committing these horrific attacks of war.” He claimed that his 
country had the right to respond in self-defense  against Afghanistan as it “harbored” the 
terrorists responsible for the attacks. He first asked the government of Afghanistan to 
hand over Osama bin Laden, the head of the group, as the government had confidential 
evidence of his responsibility for the attack. Might be used in the intro before saying what 
my topic is.  
Internationally, the Security Council responded by adopting the 1368 resolution on 12 
September which strongly condemned the attacks on the U.S. and recognized them as 
threats to international peace and security. Another resolution, 1373, adopted on 28 
September 2001, called all States to cooperate to respond to the attacks of 9/11 in 
accordance with the UN Charter. All States in the negotiations of both resolutions and in 
their addresses to the Council showed sympathy to the U.S. and expressed the need to 
take further actions (led by the Council). However, on October 7
th
  2001, the U.S. 
supported by  NATO used its armed forces to attack Afghanistan after it sent a letter to 
the United Nations which reported the use of force as an exercise of its inherent right to 
self-defense following the 9/11 attacks. Therefore, the question raised here is whether the 
U.S. armed attacks on the territory of Afghanistan were justified under international law 
or not? Might be used in the intro before saying what my topic is. ALSO research 
question.  
The reason why this question is crucial and valid is that the U.S., in its letter to the 
Council, justified attacking Afghanistan based on self-defense under Article 51. 
However, many serious doubts on the legality of these counter attacks have arisen after 
closer analysis. Concerns were raised on whether the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade 
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Center could amount to  “armed attacks,” which would thereby trigger the right of the 
U.S. under Article 51 to attack as in the form of self-defense. Moreover, it is important to 
analyze the Security Council’s role in this war, as it did neither authorize nor prohibit the 
U.S. from attacking Afghanistan. Furthermore, it is unclear what was mentioned in U.S. 
letter to the Council and what exactly was the “central role” connection between Taliban 
and al Qaeda.. But even if the U.S. could categorize the attacks as armed attacks by a 
State due to a clear al Qaeda-Taliban connection, the question remains: did the U.S. 
satisfy customary law requirements of self-defense on 7 October or not? This thesis 
argues that the 9/11 attacks by terrorist organization al Qaeda do not amount to an armed 
attack which would give the U.S. the right to use force under Article 51. It further argues 
that even if the U.S. had the right of anticipatory use of force to deter future threats on its 
nationals, it still did not satisfy the customary law requirements of this right. Finally, it 
argues that although the U.S. reported its attacks to the Security Council on 7 October,  
the Council did not authorize a U.S. unilateral response, but rather  called for a 
multilateral response led by the Council itself, through both the 1368 and 1373 
resolutions. It can be concluded that the U.S. did not have a concrete legal basis for its 
attacks, based on further analysis of the rules of international law. What my thesis argues. 
Part I of the thesis analyzes the current rules of international law on the resort to force 
found in treaties, customs, court rulings and general principles. Part II then applies these 
rules to the 9/11 incident to discuss on which basis the attacks could amount to armed 
attacks, aggression, or use of force. Part III assumes that the U.S. had the right under 
Article 51 to attack Afghanistan, considering it a future threat;  it discusses to what extent 
was the U.S. still bound by customary law requirements in its anticipatory self-defense. 
Part IV clarifies that even if the U.S. had the right to act in self-defense, this right must 
have been exercised under the supervision of the Council, once found in compliance with 
resolutions 1368 and 1373.      
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II. The Legal Framework 
   The legal framework is an important aspect of any case in international law. This 
chapter will discuss three main legal provisions found in international law treaties, 
customs and general principles. These three provisions are essential in any discussion 
regarding the legality of resorting to force under international law. The first part of this 
chapter will discuss the prohibition of the threat or use of force found in the UN Charter 
and customary law. It will also argue States’ responsibility under international law when 
using force and the divergence between the scales of using force. The second part also 
will discuss the right of States to invoke self-defense as an exception of the general 
prohibition of using force. It will discuss the definition of armed attacks as a reason to 
invoke self-defense. It will also discuss the legality of anticipatory self-defense and the 
customary law requirements for legal self-defense found in historical cases. Finally, it 
will discuss the Security Council’s role as the only international authoritative body 
concerned with justifying the use of force or any other measures.        
A. The Prohibition of the Use of Force 
   This part will discuss an important rule of international relations governing the use of 
force since the United Nations Charter codification in 1945. One of the main objectives 
of the United Nations Charter is found in Article 2 (4) “[a]ll Members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state.”1  Today, this article is considered to be the basis 
of any discussion related to the “use of force” in international relations. Humphrey 
Waldock, a British human rights jurist and international lawyer, said that Art 2(4) is the 
“cornerstone of peace in the Charter.” Louis Henkin , a former president of the American 
Society of International Law, said it is the “heart of the United Nations Charter.”2 This 
article imports the overall main goal of United Nations Charter in peacekeeping and 
limiting the “use of force” in threatening other State members.  
1. The Charter of the United Nations Article 2 (4). 
   The United Nations most important evolution was the limitations it imposed on States 
regarding the use of force.
3
 The Dumbarton Oaks Proposal for a General International 
Organization was the main basis for adopting the 1945 UN Charter.
4
 Oaks proposal said 
                                                          
1
 U.N. CHARTER, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24, 
1945.  
2
MAX PLANCK INSTITUTION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, USE OF 
FORCE 267 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 4), (1992).  
3
 MYRA WILLIAMSON, TERRORISM, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 221, (Alison Kirk ed., 
Elaine Coupe ed., Nikki Dines ed., Patrick Cole ed., University of Waikato New Zealand 2009) (2009). 
4
 Id. 
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that the main goal of the organization is to “maintain international peace and security.”5 
Oaks proposal main desire of limiting States was drafted later in Article 2 (4) of the UN 
Charter, which creates a general obligation to all States on the prohibition to use force.
6
 
a. The Prohibition of the “Threat or Use” of Force in Article 2 (4) 
       Oaks proposal aim was to  limit States’ opportunities to use force; however it went 
beyond this provision to include  the prohibition of “threats to the peace” and “other 
breaches to the peace.”7 In that sense, Article 2(4) is a “prohibitive law” and codifies the 
use of force by States in their international relations.
8
 There were plenty of debates 
considering the scale of the words “threat” and “force” and their meaning. In order to 
have clearer view on the meaning of the article it must be explained in three aspects. The 
first aspect of the article is that it is confined to the use of force by United Nations 
member States in their international relations.
9
 Internal conflicts, for example, are not 
covered by this article. The second aspect is that the article prohibits “force” not “war,” 
which means that it covers even the less grave form of the “use of force”.10 Thirdly, 
“force” in the article is not preceded by “armed,” which raised a number of debates on 
whether “force” includes economic and political force or it just violent force.11 There was 
an argument raised by States such as Brazil that “Force” in this article includes political 
and economic coercion.
12
 However, in the context of the article, the term force is “to 
denote violence whether electronic or kinetic but at the end it results to violence occurred 
or threatened.”13 Therefore the use of economic or political pressures is not within the 
scope of Article 2 (4) as a “threat or use of force,” unless they were coupled by violent 
force.
14
  
   Article 2 (4) goes beyond the prohibition of the actual “use of force” and also prohibits 
the “threat” to use force. The article reference to “threat or use of force” and “war” shows 
a much broader range of prohibition.
15
 However, not every “threat” to use force is 
                                                          
5
 Dumbarton Oaks Proposal for a General International Organization, Chapter 1 Article 1. 
6
 MYRA WILLIAMSON, TERRORISM, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 221, (Alison Kirk ed., 
Elaine Coupe ed., Nikki Dines ed., Patrick Cole ed., University of Waikato New Zealand 2009) (2009). 
7
 Id, at 220. 
8
 Ryan T. Williams, Dangerous Precedent: America’s Illegal War in Afghanistan, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 563 
(2011). 
9
 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE, 87, (Cambridge University Press, 
5
th
 ed., 2011) (1988). 
10
 Id. 
11
 Id. 
12
 MAX PLANCK INSTITUTION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, USE OF 
FORCE, 268 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 4), (1992). 
13
 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE, 88, (Cambridge University Press, 
5
th
 ed., 2011) (1988). 
14
 Id. 
15
 MYRA WILLIAMSON, TERRORISM, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 222, (Alison Kirk ed., 
Elaine Coupe ed., Nikki Dines ed., Patrick Cole ed., University of Waikato New Zealand 2009) (2009). 
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prohibited under the article, for a threat to be prohibited under the article it must “relate 
to a projected use of force that unlawful.”16 This understanding was confirmed in 1996 in 
the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons: 
The notion of “threat” and “use” of force under Article 2, paragraph 4, of 
the Charter stand together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a 
given case is illegal, for whatever reason, the threat to use such force will 
likewise be illegal. In short, if it is to be lawful, the declared readiness of a 
State to use force must be a use of force that is in conformity with the 
Charter (emphasis added).
17
  
Moreover, Article 2 (3) of the Charter states that all State members should settle “their 
international disputes by peaceful means” in a manner consequent to the international law 
treaties, and customs. Therefore, the general prohibition on States to refrain from the use 
of force found in Article 2 (4) was strengthened by Article 2(3) requirements.
18
 
b. The Provision Considering Territorial Integrity and Political Independence  
   It is mentioned in Article 2 (4) that States, in some cases, shall refrain from the use of 
force against the “territorial integrity” and “political independence” of another state 
member. Although according to Article 4 of the Charter, only States eligible to become 
members of the United Nations Charter are bound by “the obligations contained in the 
present Charter.” However it is not pertinent as to whether a state recognizes another. In 
other words, de facto governments are bound by the obligations of the Charter as well. It 
is generally accepted that a de facto government is subjected to and protected by the 
article.
19
 However the elements of “territorial integrity” and “political independence” 
might be seen as loopholes in Article 2 (4). The narrow interpretation of Article 2 (4) 
presumes that the use of force toward another State in not forbidden under the article as 
long as it does not violate both elements.
20
 However, this narrow interpretation failed to 
give an understanding to the next phrase “or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purpose of the United Nations.” Dinstein said that “[t]his phrase creates a residual catch-
all provision” which shows that the Charter’s intention was not to restrict the scope of the 
                                                          
16
 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE, 88, (Cambridge University Press, 
5
th
 ed., 2011) (1988). 
17
 Legality of the Use of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,  ICJ Rep. 226, 47, 
(1996). 
18
 MYRA WILLIAMSON, TERRORISM, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 223, (Alison Kirk ed., 
Elaine Coupe ed., Nikki Dines ed., Patrick Cole ed., University of Waikato New Zealand 2009) (2009). 
19
 MAX PLANCK INSTITUTION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, USE OF 
FORCE 268 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 4), (1992). 
20
 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE, 89, (Cambridge University Press, 
5
th
 ed., 2011) (1988). 
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prohibition.
21
 Moreover the preparation of drafting the Charter shows that these elements 
were not originally included in the article but also added for political reasons, with a  
“particular emphasis,” but not to restrict the prohibition to use force.22  
   This understanding is shown in the Corfu Channel Case when the United Kingdom 
used forcible intervention in Albanian waters to gather evidence to know who was 
responsible for mining the two British warships.
23
 The U.K. claimed that it did not violate 
Article 2 (4) by using force in Albanian territory as it did not threaten its  territorial 
integrity or its political independence.
24
 However the International Court of Justice 
rejected this narrow interpretation of the article showing that:  
It can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a 
policy of force such as has in the past give rise to most serious abuses and 
such as cannot find a place in international law. It is still less admissible in 
the particular form it would take here-it would be reserved for the most 
powerful states.
25
  
This was constructed by the Court in the Nicaragua as a blanket condemnation of 
intervention even if it does not aim at political independence or political integrity.
26
 The 
Court  in the Nicaragua quoted the International Court of Justice Report of 1949 when it 
mentioned "[b]etween independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an 
essential foundation of international relations."
27
 Therefore any sort of interference by 
armed forces in another State, even if it does not aim political independence or political 
integrity, is considered a breach of Article 2 (4) unless it is explicitly allowed by the 
Security Council.
28
   
2. Interaction between Customary Law and Article 2 (4). 
   The United Nations Charter serves as a starting point for the rules prohibiting the use of 
force, jus ad bellum; however, it is “difficult to accept the idea” that the Charter 
                                                          
21
 Id at 90. 
22
 Id. 
23 CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, 25, (Malcolm D. Evans 
ed., Phoebe N. Okowa ed., Oxford University Press 2000) (2000).   
24
 Id. 
25
 ICJ Rep. (1949), 34. 
26
 CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, 24-25, (Malcolm D. 
Evans ed., Phoebe N. Okowa ed., Oxford University Press 2000) (2000). 
27
 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicar. v. U.S., I.C.J. 14, 
202, (June 27, 1986).  
28
 MAX PLANCK INSTITUTION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, USE OF 
FORCE, 270 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 4), (1992). 
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establishes alone a “comprehensive regulatory regime for the use of force.”29 Other 
sources such as the general principles and customary law establish a “robust” framework 
for the legal rules governing the use of force.
30
 The UN Charter, customary law, and 
general principles are used comprehensively to regulate the States use of force under 
international law. 
a. Is Article 2 (4) dead ?  
   When States  use force in their international relations they usually invoke the right of 
self-defense under Article 51.
31
 Therefore, many governments will “misinterpret or 
misrepresent the law or apply incorrect legal terminology to label their actions.”32 
Governments that breach Article 2 (4) due to misunderstanding the law, whether 
intentional or not, could not present that there are no legal restrains on the interstate use 
of force.
33
 Moreover Security Council Resolutions tend not to clearly use the language of 
Article 2 (4) and Article 51.
34
 When they do refer to the Charter, in most cases, they cite 
the general rules of the Charter in the preamble.
35
 The conditions in the resolutions are 
limited to the general facts of the case to secure more condemnation. Nevertheless, only a 
few States were considered outlaws and condemned for breaching Article 2 (4), as per the 
Security Council and General Assembly. Examples include Portugal when it refused to 
leave its colonial territories and Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. In most 
cases the resolutions do not make a general pronouncement on the breach of a certain 
notion or rule..
36
 
  A few writers have made the argument as to  why the Security Council and General 
Assembly do not name States responsible for breaching Article 2 (4). One theory is that 
the decision falls to the political panderings of the permanent members of the Council 
and their veto power.
37
 In that sense, the argument that Article 2 (4) is dead was raised 
and consequently new provisions on the right to use force were evolved in parallel.
38
 
Authors such as D’ Amato raised the argument that the absence of strict resolutions on 
                                                          
29
 EVAN J. CRIDDLE & WILLIAM C. BANKS, CUSTOMARY CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF 
FORCE:  ARTICLE 51 WITH AN AMERICAN ACCENT, 15, http://insct.syr.edu/wp- 
content/uploads/2015/10/Customary_Constraints_on_the_Use_of_Force.pdf. 
30
 Id. 
31 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE, 97, (Cambridge University Press, 
5
th
 ed., 2011) (1988). 
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. 
34
 CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, 14, (Malcolm D. Evans 
ed., Phoebe N. Okowa ed., Oxford University Press 2000) (2000). 
35
 Id. 
36
 Id at 15. 
37
 Id at 17. 
38
 Id. 
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the “use of force” according to Article 2 (4) by both the Security Council and the General 
Assembly could be seen as an emergence of the new right to use force.
39
 D’ Amato’s 
argument was raised because States, when trying to justify their use of force, mostly 
embrace the argument of the emergence of a new customary right to use force powered 
by some traditional doctrines.
40
 On the other hand, O. Schechter in his book, In Defense 
of International Rules on the Use of Force said, “[n]o State has ever suggested 
[explicitly] that violation of Article 2 (4) opened the door to free use of force (emphasis 
added).” 41 Unlike what was said by Thomas Frank that “[a]rticle 2 (4) has died again, 
and this time, perhaps for good” Dinstein said that “[t]he plea that Article 2 (4) is dead 
has never been put forward by any Government.”42 The question of “how far divergences 
from the prohibition on the use of force should be seen not as breaches, but rather as 
exceptions to or modifications of the prohibition” is very important in that sense to 
examine whether new rules could emerge from illegal practice of international law.
43
 The 
International Court of Justice in Nicaragua refused the claim of “emergence of new 
customary law” and that States; illegal practice of using force justifies a new birth of 
customary rule.
44
 The court commented striking the previous argument considering States 
behave and practice: 
The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, 
the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with 
the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court 
deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be 
consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent 
with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that 
rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.
45
 
   Unlike what believed by scholars such as Frank and D’Amato, some State practices in 
violating the prohibition to use force stated in Article 2 (4) are neither an indication of 
Article 2(4)’s death nor the emergence of new customary rules, which override it. For a 
certain rule to die and for another rule to emerge, there must be an acceptance and 
practice from the majority of States on that rule, and to recognize the need for a 
replacement. According to O. Schechter, it seems that States never suggested that another 
international rule override Article 2 (4) because of its death. Some scholars, such as 
                                                          
39
 Id at 19. 
40
 Id. 
41
 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE, 97, (Cambridge University Press, 
5
th
 ed., 2011) (1988). 
42
 Id at 96. 
43
 CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, 19, (Malcolm D. Evans 
ed., Phoebe N. Okowa ed., Oxford University Press 2000) (2000). 
44
 Id. 
45
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicar. v. U.S., I.C.J. 14, 
186, (June 27 1986). 
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Dinstein, when trying to justify a certain State use of force,  do not argue that frequent 
violation of Article 2(4) is an indication of the birth of a new rule, which overrides any 
existing ones. However, they argue that certain incidents and episodes, such as the global 
terrorism phenomena, might alter the rules governing the use of force forming new 
“instant” customary laws, which still function parallel to Article 2 (4).46 They argue the 
emergence of new rules because of certain status, without raising the argument of Article 
2 (4)’s death because of the existence of these new rules.47 Moreover, another important 
condition which should be met for a new rule to emerge, is that it must not contradict an 
existing jus cogens norms.  This will be argued later in the section.  
b. Similarities between Customary and Treaty Law on the Use of Force 
   The International Court of Justice in Nicaragua regarded the provisions of the Charter 
on the use of force open to change as it is “dynamic rather than fixed, and thus capable of 
change through years.”48 However, the parties agreed that the fundamental principle of 
the use of force in Article 2 (4) is customary law, and the Court accepted that without 
asking how far did the article’s prohibition evolve over time.49 The Court in Nicaragua 
argued what could amount as a “use of force” under Article 2 (4) was not what amounts 
to an “armed attack” under Article 51.50 The Court reached three conclusions considering 
whether customary law and treaty law are identical on the use of force.
51
 First, the 
Charter does not match exactly the customary law on the use of force and there are some 
variations between them, mostly being seen in self-defense rather than use of force.
52
 
Secondly, in the case when treaty law and customary law overlap, they will still exist side 
by side in order to apply the latter if the adjunction cannot rely on the treaty law.
53
  
Thirdly, although the Charter and customary law are not completely identical regarding 
regulating the use of force, there are no conflicts between both. The court found great 
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similarities between both in the jus ad bellum as customary law has “consolidated under 
the influence of the Charter.”54 
c. The Prohibition of the Use of Force as a Peremptory Norm 
   Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties did not mention what is a 
jus cogens rule; it shows to what extent the rule has hierarchy above other rules.
55
 It 
mentioned that “[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law”56 then it described the criteria of a rule to 
consider jus cogens when it stated that the “peremptory norm of general international law 
is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as 
a norm from which no derogation is permitted.”57  According to the ICTY Trial Chamber, 
the peremptory norm is “a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy 
than treaty law and even ordinary and customary rules.” In its commentary on the draft of 
the Vienna Convention, the International Law Commission mentioned that the Charter’s 
prohibition to use force is “a conspicuous example” of jus cogens.”58  Moreover, the 
International Law Commission in 2001, while concluding its work on state responsibility, 
said “it is generally agreed that the prohibition of aggression is to be regarded as 
preemptory.”59    
3. State Responsibility for an Internationally Wrongful Act 
   A State is not a legal person that could be subjected to any penal sanctions such as a 
death sentence or imprisonment. The State bears different sorts of responsibilities and 
sanctions, as an artificial legal person, under international law. The essence of State 
responsibility is the reparation of the injury made by the international wrongful act.
60
 The 
reparation could be in a form of financial compensation to the damage caused to the other 
State. Diplomatic and economic measures taken against the State also could serve as 
reparation.
61
 Even if the international wrongful act was not made directly by the State, it 
still entails responsibility on persons who act as organs of it. Reparations could take the 
shape of satisfaction such as the ruling of the Court in the 2007 Genocide case.
62
 The 
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International Court of Justice ruled in the Genocide that “satisfaction is the appropriate 
form of reparation for the breach of an obligation to prevent genocide.”63 The question 
worth asking is whether the State is responsible for the international wrongful act by non-
state actors. 
a. Law Commission 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States 
   Article 1 of the Drafted Articles on the Responsibility of States mentions “every 
internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international responsibility of that 
State.”64 The articles of the Law Commission link non-state actor’s acts with the State 
responsible under different standards according to the support, control, acknowledgement 
of the act...etc. Article 5 of the text mentions “[t]he conduct of a person or entity which is 
not an organ of the State…but which is empowered by the law of that State…shall be 
considered an act of the State…provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in 
the particular instance.”65 The article shows that the act of whatever entity or 
organization, which is not an organ of a State according to its statute and internal law, is 
still attributable to the State if the entity is acting according to the capacity and power 
given by that State.  
   Article 8 mentioned that the conduct of a person or group of persons is also attributable 
to the State if they are “acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of 
that State in carrying out the conduct.” It imposes another rule of the general rule of 
international law, which is the only conduct attributable to the State is that of its organs 
of government. Also the conduct of a person which is directed or controlled by a State is 
attributable to that State even if the person is not one of its organs.
66
 Article 11 of the 
same text adopted an even wider explanation of the State’s responsibility than Article 8. 
It clarified that even if the conduct “is not attributable to a State under the preceding 
articles” the State is still responsible for it if “the State acknowledges and adopts the 
conduct in question as its own.”67 The article extends the responsibility of States on their 
non-state actors. A State is responsible on, not only the acts controlled by it, but also the 
acts, which it adopts and acknowledges. In other words, a State still bears responsibility 
under international law even if it does not adopt the actions of non-state actors but 
acknowledged these actions and failed to take the necessary steps to prevent them.
68
   
                                                          
63
 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE, 110,  (Cambridge University 
Press, 5
th
 ed., 2011) (1988). 
64
 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the International 
Law Commission, 53
rd
 Session, 43, 283 (2001).  
65
 Id. 
66
 MYRA WILLIAMSON, TERRORISM, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 270, (Alison Kirk ed., 
Elaine Coupe ed., Nikki Dines ed., Patrick Cole ed., University of Waikato New Zealand 2009) (2009). 
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. 
18 
 
b. The Extent of State Control under Historical Cases 
   The mere question on cases which bear the responsibility of State is whether the act of 
non-state actors could be attributable to the State or not. In Nicaragua the Court stated 
that acts of mercenaries could be considered acts of the State only if the “degree of 
dependence on the one side and control on the other.”69 Moreover it mentioned that 
“general control” over the mercenaries is not enough for a State to bear its responsibility 
because that does not mean that it enforced or directed them in that specific operation to 
violate other State territory under international law.
70
 The Court said “[f]or this conduct 
to give rise to legal responsibilities” of the State, “it would in principle have to be proved 
that the State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course 
of which the alleged violations were committed (emphasis added).”71 The arming and 
training the Contra rebel group could be seen as an involvement of the use of force 
against Nicaragua, however the court saw that the US committed a prima facie violation 
of the principle of non use of force while an act of intervention in the internal affairs of 
Nicaragua did not in itself amount to an armed attack attributable to it.
72
 The ICJ 
“theoretically drew a line” between terrorists who commit attacks as an organ of a certain 
State and terrorists who attack by their own with no State sponsoring their acts.
73
  The 
standard given in Nicaragua for State responsibility is the “effective control” over the 
military operations made by the mercenaries or the non state actors. 
   On the other hand, the ICTY Appeals Chamber made a wider view of the extent 
of State control over non-state actors when said: 
[C]control by a State over subordinate armed forces or militias or 
paramilitary units may be of an overall character…The control required by 
international law may be deemed to exist when a State has a role in 
organizing, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military 
group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing 
operational support to that group (emphasis added).
74
    
According to Tadic doctrine it requires wider control by the State over non-state actors in 
order to consider the later as a de facto government and bear State’s responsibility. The 
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Tadic doctrine support the view that for the auxiliaries to count as de facto government of 
a State it must act under the instructions of that State concerning the detail of every 
individual operation. Moreover, the State should exercise overall control and support 
over there logistic, arms, finance, etc.
75
 The ICTY saw that acts of Bosnian Serbs army 
could be “imputed” to the government of Serbia, as it had an “overall” control over their 
acts.
76
 
   The test of “effective control” is more usable for the International Law Commission in 
the case of attribution than “overall control” as it argues that the Court intent in the ICTY 
when mentioned “overall control” that it means the overall control in the jus in Bello 
situation not the jus ad bellum.
77
 Moreover, in 2007 Genocide International court of 
Justice judgment referred to the degree of "effective control" that is required for 
auxiliaries rather than “overall control.”78 In 2005 Armed Activities the International 
Court of Justice reached the conclusion that what has to be known is whether the conduct 
of non-state actors was made "on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of" 
a given State.
79
 Article 8 of the Drafted Articles relied on the "effective control" standard 
when it mentioned “under the direction or control.” 
c. Agreement and Consent of States on Military Assistance 
  
   It is important to understand that the prohibition of the use of force in Article 2 (4) does 
not strict States sovereignty to act in favor of their interests.
80
 Parties of any conflict can 
reach an agreement to solve their dispute by any mean they agree upon, even if it 
includes the use of force.
81
 State responsible on non-state actor’s attacks can reach an 
agreement with the victim State to turn over the appraisal to whatever domestic or 
international organ. Also according to Article 20 of the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility a State which non-state actor activates on could ask the military assistance 
of other State to eliminate the terrorist on its territory. However, according to the article, 
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essence of the consent is that the extent of the act of the State called for assistance is 
“within the limits of that consent.”82      
4. Divergence between Use of force, Aggression, and Armed Attack. 
   At the time of 1945 UN Charter adoption, it was seen that the international community 
in the Pact of the Arab League, the Organization of American States Charter, and the 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, continued to do efforts to define what 
should amount as an aggressive act.
83
 The lack of an authoritative definition of 
aggression has its implications on the exercise of self-defense, since there are noticeable 
differences between the war of aggression and the war of self-defense. However, 
according to Treaties, State practice and international bodies condemning aggression, 
there was a need for the emergence of an international agreement considering the 
illegality of aggression, regardless of its motives.
84
 However, still it is problematic to 
define what amounts to an aggressive act until nowadays. Same as the difficulty in 
defining terrorism, “states prefer to be left to decide matters on a case-by-case basis [of 
aggression] without being beholden to the limitations of an entrenched definition.”85     
a. Definition of Aggression 
   Since the Proposal of Dumbarton Oaks on the formation of the United Nations Charter, 
Mr. Paul Boncour, a UN Reportuer, mentioned that most of States did not support the 
“amendment…to include a definition of aggression” in the Charter.86 Although the 
definition of aggression is nowadays widely accepted in the legal doctrine, still it is not 
universal.
87
 However, at least one paragraph of the General Assembly 1974 Definition of 
Aggression was used by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua as a customary 
law.
88
 Although the General Assembly definition of aggression does not define armed 
attack it shows the governmental understanding that acts of aggression includes varieties 
of actions harbored by States such as “cross border attacks, naval ship attacks.”89 Article 
3 (g) defined act of aggression as “[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed 
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
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another State.” Article 5 (2) made a distinction between “war of aggression” and “crime 
of aggression.” The article shows that crimes of aggression give rise to international 
responsibility but the war of aggression, which is graver, is a crime against peace, which 
could evolve to become an armed attack under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
90
  
Moreover, Article 8 (1) of the International Criminal Court Statute made another 
distinction between the act of aggression and a crime of aggression in order to qualify as 
an act falls under the jurisdiction of the Court. According to the definition an act of 
aggression to qualify a crime of aggression it must by its “charter, gravity, and scale” 
constitutes a “manifest violation of the Charter.” According to the previous definitions, it 
seems that every use of force entails State Responsibility, but not consequently 
considered an armed attack. However, still different definitions call the need to argue two 
main conditions, gravity and source of an attack, in order to know the nature of the act 
whether a use of force, aggression, or armed attack.    
b. The Gravity, Scale. and Effect of the Attack 
   The Court in Nicaragua stated that there is: 
no reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed attacks, 
may apply to the sending by a state of armed bands to the territory of 
another state, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would 
have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier 
incident had it been carried out by regular armed force.
91
  
It drew a distinction between the grave forms of use of force “armed attack” and the less 
grave form, use of force.
92
 The Court said that provision of arms from the government of 
Nicaragua to the opposition in the neighboring States might be seen as an incursion from 
the government, but does not amount to an armed attack which raises the right to self-
defense. Considering the condition of scale of the attack, the Court made the distinction 
between frontier incidents and armed attacks. Moreover, Eritrea Ethiopia Claims 
Commission included while mentioning frontier incidents as a less grave form of use of 
force “these relatively minor incidents were not of a magnitude to constitute an armed 
attack by either States against the other within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter.”93 Unlike war of aggression, the circumstances and motivations of the frontier 
incident is not to carry out an armed attack with sufficient gravity from the definition of 
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aggression.
94
 However, an armed attack does not need to take the shape of a massive 
military operation. In the Oil Platforms case the Court concluded that it is not the gravity 
or scale of the attack which determines an armed attack, also the effect and character of 
an attack could be reasons to define the attack as armed under Article 51. The Court said 
that it “does not exclude the possibility that the mining of a single military vessels might 
be sufficient to bring into play the inherent right of self defense.”95 The inquiry of 
whether the act in question is an armed attack, aggression or use of force is based on the 
“quantum of force” used in the attack “gravity”, motivation, scale, and effects.  
B. The Right to Self-defense in Customary Law and under Article 51 United 
Nations Charter.  
   Every legal system authorize to its members the right to self-defense when necessary if 
their rights were attacked by certain serious violations.
96
 The issue in international law 
legal system is that law enforcement is not centralized unlike domestic legal systems, 
therefore in international law, self-defense has much broader role.
97
 The understanding of 
self-defense in international law as a “legitimate protection against a wide variety of 
violations of State rights and interests” found in Article 51 of the Charter and customary 
international law principles.
98
      
1. Self Defense as an exception of Article 2 (4).  
   Self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter is the exception of the general prohibition 
of using force stated in Article 2 (4).
99
 Article 51 which “has become the main pillar of 
the law of self defense” states that “[n]nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations (emphasis added).”100 The article shows two important 
elements, to be satisfied “prior or subsequent” to the use of force by the State under self-
defense and when “armed attack” occurs.101   
a. Meaning of Self Defense 
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   International Court of Justice in 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons stated that the survival of a State “would be at stake” if it 
could not defend itself in any catastrophic scenario by exercising its right of self-
defense.
102
 Self-defense could be taken by States in other forms such as breaking 
diplomatic relations, or using non forcible measures, however, the essence of self-defense 
according to Article 51 is the self-help by using armed means when States right is 
violated.
103
 It seems that Article 51 goes “hand by hand” with the prohibition of 
aggression, therefore the article must be read “in conjunction” with Article 2 (4) in order 
to clarify the exception of the prohibition to use of force under international law.
104
 While 
Article 2 (4) shows the general obligation for States to refrain the threat or use of force 
against each other, Article 51 draw the exception of this prohibition in the case if an 
“armed attack” occurs. Self-defense is a right which can be invoked by States, an option 
which they have if subjected to an armed attack, unlike the prohibition to use force which 
is a duty and obligation, States might decline the right to self-defense, even if an armed 
attack happened, and choose to use political measures in ending the dispute.
105
  
    Moreover, scholars such as Jowett, Moore, and Wedlock have supported a view that 
the right of States to self-defense was found in customary law prior to the adoption of the 
Charter.
106
 Their argument were based on ICJ ruling in Nicaragua, when the U.S. argued 
that customary rules relating to the episode had been “subsumed” and “supervened” by 
the most recent treaty rules, the Court clarified that customary and treaty law “do not 
exactly overlap” on the issue of use of force, it added that Article 51 is “only meaningful 
on the basis that there is a ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’ right of self-defense, and it is hard to see 
how this can considered  other than of customary nature.”107  The Court did not suggest 
that there are overall differences between self-defense in customary law and in Article 
51; on the contrary, it realized that the article did not define some important elements of 
self-defense, which alert the need to rely on customary law to find them.
108
 Therefore, the 
right of self-defense is customary international law and is “recognized as not having been 
created by the Charter by the wording of Article 51.”109 It is mentioned in the article that 
the right of self defense is an “inherent right.” This right became not only to States 
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members of the Charter but the right “devolved” to include all States.110 Article 51 thus; 
draw the “boundaries of legitimate self-defense not only for the purpose of the UN 
Charter, but also in general international law.”111 
 
b. Armed attack as a Condition of Self-defense. 
 
   States usually invoke their right to self-defense when they use any force against another 
State.
112
 The question raised here is whether the State invoking the right was subjected to 
an armed attack which requires it to act in self defense or not. In theory it is possible, but 
according to the vast majority of cases it seems very complex to determine the legal issue 
of who have the right.
113
 It became even more difficult, as mentioned before, when the 
Security Council mainly does not give “clear” resolution on who has the right and who 
breached the obligation of the legal provisions. Security Council Resolutions in that sense 
are closer to call cease fire rather than any attribution of responsibility without giving an 
affirmative justification under Article 51 of using force in an armed attack.
114
  
   Article 51 provides that a State has the “inherent right” to act in self-defense whether 
individually or collectively “if an armed attack occurs” against it.115 Although the phrase 
“armed attack” seems clear on what it means, still State practice and argument relying on 
the article shows that it needs more consideration of its meaning. Ian Brownie, 
international law specialist, commenting on the reason why “armed attack” has no further 
explanation said, that the phrase might be regarded as being “sufficiently clear and self-
evident” which does not embrace the need for further interpretation.116 The Court in 
Nicaragua pronounced that armed attack stated in Article 51 does not include only 
“merely action by regular armed forces” but also acts by non-state governments “which 
carry out acts of armed force…of such gravity as to amount” as an actual armed attack 
launched by the regular force of the aggressor State.
117
 The Court defined armed attacks 
as the attacks done only by a State, or by irregular forces on behalf of that State when the 
gravity of the attacks amount an actual armed attack by the regular armed forces of that 
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State.
118
 The Court then added that an attack by irregular army sent on behalf of a State 
does not amount to an armed attack if the State’s role is assistance in providing “weapons 
or logistical or other support.”119 The State in question still bears responsibility on its 
assistance, however, this assistance does not amount to an armed attack, it could be 
regarded as a “threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in the internal or external 
affairs of other States.”120  
   International Court of Justice observed in 2005 Armed Activities that “[a]rticle 51 of the 
Charter may justify a use of force in self defense only within the strict confines there laid 
down. It does not allow the use of force by a State to protect perceived security interest 
beyond this pattern.”121 Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission stated in its Partial Award 
on jus ad bellum “as the text of Article 51 of the Charter makes clear, the predicate for a 
valid claim of self defense under the Charter is that the party restoring to force has been 
subjected to an armed attack.”122 It seems that the framers of the Charter when mentioned 
“armed attack” in Article 51 intended to strict this right from misinterpreting. The article 
does not mean that mere threats which falls beyond this pale of armed attack is not 
forbidden, it is still illegal but might lead to other enforcement actions and counter 
measures but not according to Article 51.
123
       
2. Anticipatory and Interceptive Self-defense. 
   There is a “restrictive interpretation” of Article 51 of the UN Charter which shows that 
States cannot use force in self-defense until they are attacked by another State, an attack 
which amount to an “armed attack” under Article 51.124 While other “broad 
interpretation” noted that “armed attack” is only “one instance” of Article 51 
justifications of using force in self-defense, it added that instant overwhelming threat of 
an armed attack is another instance of self-defense justifications.
125
 In this part, different 
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arguments on whether States are justified to use force to deter an attack in an anticipate 
manner will be discussed. 
a. Anticipatory use of force 
   The argument of anticipatory use of force is refused usually by the majority of States, 
the reason why when they act in anticipatory manner they tend not to lay down the 
argument of anticipatory self defense in order to provide the widest support available for 
their actions.
126
 However, the U.S. always raises the claim that “it can take preemptive 
military actions in exercise of its right to self-defense.”127 The United States Standing 
Rules of Engagement “posit the right to take actions in self defense not only in response 
to a hostile act, but even hostile intent.”128 It considers the “hostile intent” as an imminent 
threat to use force.
129
 Anticipatory self defense became more serious even after the 
horrific attacks of 9/11 on the US. A well known policy statement made by the US 
president Bush considering preemptive self defense named “Bush Doctrine” which was 
understood as the “right to counter threats before they morph into concrete action 
especially by terrorist.”130 Also Israel practiced anticipatory self defense when attacked 
Iraq at 1981 as it accused the later for building nuclear reactor which will be used in 
attacking Israel in the future.
131
 Security Council condemned the Israel act as violating 
the Charter on the bases that it failed to find peaceful means to solve the dispute 
moreover there was no evidence that Iraq was planning to attack Israel.
132
 The ICJ in 
Nicaragua based its decision on the norms of customary international law concerning 
self-defense in response to an armed attack, which already has occurred.
133
 It passed no 
judgment on the issue of response to an imminent threat. However, Judge Schwebel in his 
opinion in the case rejected the reading that Article 51 only applies when an armed attack 
occurs.
134
 Considering anticipatory self-defense, Dinstein made an opinion on the legality 
of the issue when he justified anticipatory self-defense relying on the evidence of an 
imminent attack, and the intelligence determining its time, he stated: 
[t]he right to self defense can be invoked in response to an armed attack at an 
incipient stage, as soon as it becomes evident to the victim State (on the basis 
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of hard intelligence available at the time) that the attack is actually in the 
process of being mounted. There is no need to wait for the bombs to fall – or, 
for that matter, for fire to open – if certain that the armed attack is under way 
(even in preliminary manner). The Victim State can lawfully intercept (under 
Article 51) the armed attack, with a view to blunting its edge (emphasis 
added).
135
 
Dinstein justifies anticipatory self-defense relying on practical logic basis, he said 
that a State which is about to be attacked should not wait until it is bombed from 
the aggressor State. He justified anticipatory self-defense under two considerable 
conditions; first is when the attacks are in the process of being actually mounted 
and, secondly, is when there are hard intelligence proofing the first claim. 
   I disagree with scholars who support “restrictive interpretation” of Article 51 that 
self-defense is justified only if an armed attack was launched by another State. 
However, I understand their noble objective of “strengthen universal peace” by 
drawing limits to the circumstance which justifies the exercise of self-defense.
136
 
However, practically speaking I believe that even if the restrictive approach would 
be applied, it might limit some States from the use force in self-defense to 
anticipate act of aggression, however other powerful States such as (Israel, the US, 
and Australia) might not follow such pattern and will still argue their right to 
anticipatory self-defense on different basis.
137
 This restrictive approach might not 
be productive because the right is already exercised by the dominant States. What I 
see more productive is to justify the use of force in anticipatory self-defense but 
with certain boundaries and limits such as what is understood in Caroline incident, 
in the case when threats are imminent and overwhelming. On other words, State 
cannot attack another State using the argument of anticipatory self-defense as later 
forms threat to it, the victim State could only raise this argument when the attack is 
imminent and about to happen. 
   Another important limitation for practicing anticipatory self-defense was 
presented by Dinstein when he said that the existence of an imminent threat as a 
reason to justify anticipatory self-defense should be based on “hard intelligence.”138 
I support this view, but I am adding that these hard intelligence and sources should 
be provided to an international body concerned such as the Council. The evidence 
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proven an imminent threat is not to satisfy the State which claims self-defense, but 
the majority of the international community.  
   I believe that anticipatory self-defense is legal, when evidence proofs an 
overwhelming imminent attack based on hard intelligence, submitted to an official 
international body concerned. Even if it is not problematic to call for an 
amendment of Article 51 in the issue of justifying anticipatory self-defense, I will 
not support it on two different bases, first is that whether liked or not the right is 
already exercised, secondly is that adding new rules might be misused to benefit 
certain States interests?
139
 My opinion on the legality of anticipatory self defense.  
   It seems that although the majority of States opinion juries does not permit the 
right of anticipatory self-defense, they agreed upon an exception to that rule in the 
case when the “threat is imminent and the use of force is inevitable.”140   
b. Interceptive Self-defense 
   Unlike anticipatory self-defense, interceptive self-defense is a reaction to certain events 
has already begun to happen however not fully complete.
141
 The cornerstone here is not 
who fired the first shot, but who started an apparently irreversible action which shows the 
readiness of an armed attack.
142
Waldock, phrased it when said “[w]here there is 
convincing evidence not merely of threats and potential danger but of an attack being 
actually mounted, then an armed attack may be said to have begun to occur, though it has 
not passed the frontier.”143 Moreover, according to the Oil Platforms judgment, a series 
of acts also could categorize as an armed attack, which justify self-defense. Such as what 
happened in 1967 Egyptian – Israeli war, although Israel was the first to fire, Egypt made 
a serious of acts, closing the straits of Tiran and ejecting UN emergency force from Sinai, 
which could be understood to form an armed attack justifying Israel self-defense.
144
 
Interceptive self-defense is lawful under Article 51 however; it must be based on reliable 
and reasonable information available at the time of the action.
145
 States who support 
anticipatory self-defense argue the Caroline incident of 1837; however, they “misplace” 
their actions legal basis. The case has a historical position taken by the US Secretary of 
State Webster which considers nowadays as a part of customary law.
146
  According to 
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Webster’s prospective, for self defense to be admitted, a State required to show 
“necessity of self defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of mean, and no 
moment of deliberation.”147               
3. Conditions Precedent to the Exercise of Self-defense 
   The requirements mentioned in Webster’s formula considered as part of the basic core 
of self-defense.
148
 Although these requirements are not referred to in the Charter, 
however, due to State practice and ICJ rulings, it is considered as part of customary 
international law.
149
 Nicaragua and the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons “reaffirmed that necessity and proportionality are limits on all 
self defense, individual and collective.”150  These two conditions are accompanied with 
immediacy, although it is not “expressly recognized by the Court” still customary 
international law “fully confirms its existence” in Caroline incident.151    
a. Necessity. 
   It means that, it is inevitable on the State acting in self-defense manner to establish that, 
an armed attack was launched by another State, in a definite manner, which it is forcibly, 
should respond. Judge Ago stated that in order to satisfy necessity element States acting 
should have no other means “of halting the attack other than recourse to armed force.”152 
He added that if that State had other peaceful means to solve the dispute “it would have 
no justification for adopting conduct which contravened the general prohibition on the 
use of armed force.” State responding should have “no choice of means” other than using 
force. It should have no other peaceful options such as, peaceful solutions, diplomatic 
debates, or police information exchange, while responding other than to restore to 
force.
153
 It must fulfill the existence of necessity to rely on force in responding to the 
armed attack as there are no other peaceful means is within reach at that point. It depends 
on the time available between the armed attack and the use of self-defense counter 
measures. If the circumstances allow no pause the counter force could seen lawful, but if 
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space and time were available, State should seek peaceful means. These efforts must be 
genuine attempts carried out in a good faith and not as a matter of “ritual punctilio.”154  
b. Proportionality. 
  It is the “essence of self-defense.”155 Different criteria of proportionality apply 
depending on the situation whether it is an armed attack or mere use of force. According 
to Ago, this principle must apply with some degree of flexibility.
156
 Proportionality is 
defined on the term of the original aggression on the victim State. In that sense, it is 
understood in the jus ad bellum context that the amount of force needed in defense should 
be equal to the initial attacks in order to repel them.
157
 The power used must be 
proportionate and not too excessive.
158
 It is also defined in the term of deterring and 
neutralizing future attacks, in this case, proportionality focuses on the “end game.”159 In 
another words, does the amount of the attack in response reduces the future threat.
160
 
Therefore, proportionate acts are defined as “responses parallel in intensity to an initial 
aggression and designed to discourage future attacks.”161 The amount of force used 
should be necessary to repel ongoing attack, reduce future threat of attacks, and not too 
excessive. Also it has particular meaning in the context of a war of self-defense when 
“on-the-spot reaction or defensive armed reprisals are involved, proportionality points at 
a symmetry…in ‘scale and effects’ between the unlawful force and lawful counter-
force.”162 The Court in Nicaragua saw that the US acts of mining the Nicaraguan ports 
and attacking oil installations could not be seen as proportionate to the aid received by 
the opposition in El Salvador from the government of Nicaragua. It is seen that the 
lawfulness of proportionality test is measured by its capacity to achieve the required 
results without unnecessary casualties.
163
  
c. Immediacy  
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   It also considered as a “core element” of self-defense.164 Immediacy does not require 
that self-defense has to be exercise during the armed attack; it means, “[t]here must not 
be an undue time-lag between the armed attack and the exercise of self defense in 
response.”165 In other words, self-defense actions must be done in a “timely fashion” way 
when there is no significant delay between the armed attack and the victim State act of 
self-defense.
166
  
   It could be argued that immediacy might conflicts theoretically with necessity 
requirement.
167
 Although States should seek peaceful means when available before acting 
in self-defense, the dispute still might not come to an end by these peaceful attempts, the 
thing that might lead to a time lag between the attack and the invocation of self-defense, 
therefore the proportionality requirement will not be satisfied in that case.
168
 However, 
still the State responding to an armed attack must be given reasonable time to prepare for 
the counter-measures and to find peaceful solutions as long as this delay is not as a matter 
of “ritual punctilio.”169 States also must be given time to be able to change to its present 
situation to war status. 
   The Court in Nicaragua relied on these conditions as other grounds for the illegality of 
the US attacks toward Nicaragua.
170
 It showed that even if the supply of arms by the 
government of Nicaragua to opposition forces in El Salvador could amount as an armed 
attack, the counter measures taken by the US could not be seen as legal self-defense as it 
was month later after the major offense made by Nicaragua.
171
 Therefore it did respect 
neither the necessity nor the immediacy conditions of self-defense.  
   The most controversial sort of self-defense by States invoking self-defense is the 
response to terrorist attacks. State in that sense responds to terrorist attacks which have 
already been made whether by a group of terrorist activated by their own, or harbored by 
another State. In the following situation State is supposed to respond to an attack which 
happened in the past. Therefore it is seen as a combination of protection of nationals 
abroad and anticipatory self-defense.
172
  
4. Attacks by non-state actors. 
                                                          
164
 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE, 233, (Cambridge University 
Press, 5
th
 ed., 2011) (1988). 
165
 Id. 
166
 Williamson, at 236. 
167
 Id. 
168
 Id. 
169
 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE, 232, (Cambridge University 
Press, 5
th
 ed., 2011) (1988). 
170
 CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, 106, (Malcolm D. Evans 
ed., Phoebe N. Okowa ed., Oxford University Press 2000) (2000). 
171
 Id. 
172
 Id at 107. 
32 
 
   Although there is a “dominant interpretation” for Article 51 that it cannot be invoked 
unless an “armed attack” is launched by a State or its representative, de facto organ, this 
view came to an end by the 1990.
173
 It was more dominant, according to ICJ’s rulings and 
opinion in different cases at that time, that non-state actors attacks committed by private 
militias not as an organ of a State were considered criminal activities which are combated 
through “domestic and international criminal justice mechanism.”174 In this part the 
relation between a State and non-state actors will be discussed. Moreover, this part will 
question the amount of control needed by the State on non-state actors to consider the 
later as a de facto organ of the State’s government. 
a. de facto Organ of State. 
   According to International Law Commission de facto organ is an armed group of 
irregulars, paramilitaries, contractors and like, which are supported and recruited by the 
government of a State to act against another State while it could remain out of the official 
structure.
175
 The ICJ in Nicaragua held that “it may considered to be agreed that an 
armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed force 
across an international borders”176 also armed attack could be made by irregular army 
listed in Article 3 (g) of the 1974Definition of Aggression.
177
 Moreover the 
Commission’s 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
listed the offence of the organization or the encouragement “by the authorities of a state 
of armed bands for incursions into the territory of another State, direct support of such 
incursions, and even the toleration of the use of the local territory as a base operation by 
armed bands against another State.”178 Moreover, according to Nicaragua, for a group of 
terrorist to consider as a de facto organ of a State, arms supplying and logistical support 
is not enough as long as there is no control over their acts as mentioned before. Judge 
Schwebel stressed the words in Article 3 (g) that “substantial involvement therein” 
needed to proof the link between the State and the non-state actor to consider the later as 
a de facto organ of the State.
179
 The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory stated 
that Article 51 recognizes self-defense in the case of an “armed attack by one State 
                                                          
173
 MYRA WILLIAMSON, TERRORISM, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 266, (Alison Kirk ed., 
Elaine Coupe ed., Nikki Dines ed., Patrick Cole ed., University of Waikato New Zealand 2009) (2009). 
174
 Id. 
175
 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE, 219, (Cambridge University 
Press, 5
th
 ed., 2011) (1988). 
176
 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicar. v. U.S., I.C.J. 14, 
103, (June 27, 1986) 
177
 Dinstein, at 220. 
178
 Id. 
179
 Id at 221. 
33 
 
against another State.”180 The implication of the ICJ statements is that to claim that a 
State has the right to self-defense; the armed attack that the State suffers from must be 
executed by another State.
181
 In other words, the types of attacks which Israel claimed 
when invoked its right to self-defense were not an acts by a State, they were just attacks 
by non-state actors which do not function Israel’s right to self-defense under Article 
51.
182
  
b. Non-state actors which are not organ of the State. 
   The responsibility of a State on non-state actors attacks activated on its land toward 
another State is unquestionable when evidence and information available proof that in 
such act they were acting in the capacity of that State.
183
 The debatable question here is 
whether acts of violence by non-state actors, not a de facto organ, of State A unleashed 
against State B may amount to an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the 
Charter thereby triggering the right of self-defense.
184
 State A might be considered as 
“failed State” going through unstable situations; in that case, if non-state actor on its land 
made an attack, it might not be considered as an armed attack by the State itself, as there 
is no recognized government indeed.
185
 In the Corfu Channel of 1949, the Court 
mentioned that States are under an obligation “not to allow knowingly its territory to be 
used for acts contrary to the right of other States.”186 Still the victim State could take 
lawful forcible measures in the territory of that State which terrorist activated on, even if 
they do not consider as de facto government.
187
 The failed State could reach an 
agreement with the victim State in which the later can intervene in the territory of the 
earlier and take considerable counter-measures in order to eliminate the terrorist group. 
The issue becomes more complex, considering the previous example, when State A 
refuses to cooperate with State B in neither surrendering terrorists responsible nor to 
agree an armed intervention in its territory within the scope of the consent between both. 
Unlike armed attacks, in which States could conclude the necessity to repel the attack on-
the-spot, terrorist attack gives States time for deliberation to conclude the best peaceful 
mean to end the dispute until Security Council is sized with the matter.  According to 
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Article 24 (1) of the Charter, the Security Council is the body charged with the main 
responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.   
C. Security Council Authorization. 
   According to Article 51 a State could exercise self-defense “until the Security Council 
has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security (emphasis 
added).”188 Article 51 also mentions that measures taken by States “shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council.”189 Reading the text literally will raise the argument that 
self-defense is “provisional” right which only exists until the Council has taken whatever 
measures necessary.
190
 The exercise of self-defense should stop when the Council is 
seized with the issue. Therefore, it might be understood that any actions by States are 
temporary and not “a substitute for the collective action of the [Security Council] 
(emphasis added).”191 Moreover, the Article states that States exercise of self-defense 
should be reported to the Council. It did not clarify neither the inevitability of a report nor 
its form. Therefore, there are different questions which rise from reading the text of 
Article 51 such as, the question of when the Council could be determined as “sized” with 
a certain matter, what are the means available for it, what is the form of a Council report 
and whether it is obligatory, and finally whether a State may continue in self-defense 
deterring continuing threat even if the Council has “taken measures necessary.” 
1. Security Council Main Function. 
   Security Council is entitled by the United Nations Charter to maintain peace and 
security by peaceful settlement of disputes, taking actions with respect to threats to the 
peace, make provisional measures for peacekeeping, and prevention of conflicts.
192
 
According to Article 24 (1) of the Charter, the Security Council is the body charged with 
the main responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.
193
 To compile 
with its function, Article 39 imposes the Council to determine the “existence of any threat 
to the peace” and accordingly it “shall make recommendations, or decide what measures 
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.”194  States parties of the Charter should accept the recommendations 
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and measures taken by the Council as stated in Article 25 that they “agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”195 
The article shows that according to the Charter, the decisions and measures taken by the 
Council suppose to be binding to all State parties. However, still States have the right to 
act in self-defense according to Article 51 to repel an overwhelming attack until the 
Council has taken “necessary measures” to restore peace and security. 
   The difficulty arises from the previous provision is the question of who will decide 
whether “necessary measures” were taken by the Council in order to stop the State from 
acting in self-defense.
196
 There is a debate between scholars on that question, as the 
article does not clarify the answer. Waldock stated that the right of self-defense is 
continuing until the Council brings the action into an end, in other word, he means that 
the right of self-defense does not stop once the Council has took “necessary appropriate 
measures” but until it brings the self-defensive actions between States to an end.197 I think 
this view is very extreme, in some instance proven in history, the Council might not be 
able to end the dispute between States, so it is not understandable that States will 
continue their fights until the Council could bring the action to an end. Waldock 
interpretation also was criticized for being “politically native.”198 Myra Williamson stated 
that the Council may fail to even make “any pronouncement because of political 
rivalries” and still the self-defense should come to an end “once the objective has been 
achieved” while the Council may or may not took any actions.199 Therefore, although 
there is disagreement on the Council role once self-defense is taken by States, still Article 
51 interpretation supports that the Council and not individual States is to determine 
“measures necessary” in order to maintain peace and security.200         
   The measurements taken by the Council could be, according to Article 39, whether 
economic and diplomatic measurers mentioned in Article 41 “complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other 
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations” or military 
measures, when the previous attempts fails, mentioned in Article 42 including “action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.
201
 Such action may include “demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by 
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air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”202 Although Article 43 
supposes that the Council could have a military force, according to special agreement, at 
the disposal of it whenever it asks for, the agreement has not been conclude until 
nowadays.
203
 The reason why the issue caused “division between permanent states and its 
blocs.”204 Moreover, under Article 36 (3), the Council is not expected to act as a judicial 
body; Judge Schwebel said that it is “a political organ which acts for political reasons.”205 
Its role is to separate the parties and recommend what is the most peaceful appropriate 
method of peacekeeping for their dispute.
206
 It could recommend an adjunction to The 
International Court of Justice same as what happened in the Corfu Channel, only when it 
failed to evaluate the facts and evidence available; it recommended the parties to bring 
the dispute to the ICJ.
207
 Finally, in the case of armed conflict the Council entitled to 
adopt other measures such as cease-fire order, order to withdrawal forces, establishment 
of a truce, or conclusion of armistice agreement.
208
   
2. The Two Phase Rule. 
   When acting in a certain conflict, a State could not be the “final arbiter of the legality of 
its own act.”209 If every State, by its own, will justify its own acts as self-defense with no 
legal boundaries, the international legal system of holding force “would have been an 
exercise in futility.”210 Still State under attack has no choice but to respond in order to 
defend itself before more future damages. It does not have time to wait for any judicial or 
political body to interfere in the dispute while it is under attack. It could not wait for the 
Security Council notional armed force shaped by Article 43 to repel the aggressor, it 
should act by itself. According to The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, the process of self-defense should take two separate stages; first, in practice 
the victim State has to judge for itself whether the necessity of the occasion called for an 
act of self-defense. Secondly, an international forum has to be reported immediately to 
the Council showing the justification of victim State act.
211
 In addition, Article 51 
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requires States to “immediately” report the measures of self-defense to the Council.212 
The forum reported must have “plain notification of the invocation of the right of self-
defense” plus showing clear evidence of State responsibility and the occurrence of an 
armed attack on the State victim. Depending on the report submitted, Dinstein suggests 
that the Council could take different modes of actions such as (1) give a retroactive 
approval of the act (2) ask for general cease-fire (3) demand withdrawal of forces to the 
original lines (4) insist of the cessation of the unilateral action of the defending State or 
(5) decide that the State engaging in self-defense is actually the aggressor.
213
   
   It was debatable whether reporting to the Council is a requirement of self-defense as the 
Court in Nicaragua held that the duty to report is not customary law.
214
 However, still in 
its opinion the Court said that the absence of the report may include that the State in 
question of its act is not convinced itself that it has the right to self-defense under the 
Charter.
215
 The Court was willing to take into consideration States view on their own 
actions, when they do not submit a report to the Council, as they are not convinced with 
their own actions.
216
 However, reporting to the Council is not a proof per se of the 
legality of States actions.
217
 Most States would rather report their actions to the Council 
to assume legitimacy of their self-defense; however, the Council members, General 
Assembly and States might reject these claims despite the fact that the State fulfilled 
reporting requirements stated in Article 51.
218
 Still authors have different view on the 
provision of reporting to the Council. Dinstein and Bowett consider that reporting to the 
Council is a “mandatory, legal obligation” for States, others such as Greig and Judge 
Schwebel believe that it is just a procedural requirement which considers further proofs 
for the Council.
219
 However, the readings of both Armed Activities and Eretria Ethiopia 
Claims Commission on the Jus ad Bellum, shows that the duty to report to the Council is 
a “substantive condition and a limitation on the exercise of self-defense.”220 The Court 
implied that States are precluded from the right to invoke self-defense, if it failed in its 
duty to report to the Security Council.
221
 Therefore, although reporting is not a proof per 
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se of the legality of the use of force in self-defense, still States have the duty to report the 
measures taken by them to the Council.      
 
3. Security Council Implied Authorization  
 
   Some States when cannot secure explicit authority from the Security Council to use 
force, they justify their actions relying on an implied authorization by the Council.
222
 The 
first emergence of such argument was made at 1993 by the USA and UK when the 
Council passed 688 Resolution condemning Iraq for the repression of the Kurds and 
Shiites. The Council demanded that Iraq should stop the repression and allow access to 
international humanitarian organizations. Although the Resolution did not authorize the 
use of force under Chapter VII, USA and UK refereed to it in justify intervening the 
territory of Iraq.
223
 However, “they did not offer a full legal argument in justification of 
this action.”224 The action was criticized by Russia, China and Arab League under the 
demand of stopping acts which are not justified by the Council.
225
 However, USA and 
U.K. repeated that they were acting under an authorization found in Resolution 688. The 
same authorization was raised after the Resolution 687, when the Council obliged Iraq to 
destroy its weapons of mass destruction. Although Iraq formally accepted the resolution, 
it obstructed weapons inspectors which led to another military intervention by USA and 
UK.
226
 Also Russia did not accept the legality of the action as it mentioned that cease-fire 
in 687 Resolution does not mean a justification to use force without further 
Resolutions.
227
 
 
   The Council in 2001 passed two strong Resolutions after September 11 attacks, which 
authorize self-defense by the United States to repel the attack, however, no Resolution, 
authorized the USA to use force against Afghanistan in 7 October.
228
 However, some 
authors thought that USA could find a justification of its use of military force against 
Afghanistan in both 1368 and 1373 Resolutions as it expressed “its readiness to take all 
necessary steps” which according to their reading is an implicit encouragement for USA 
to seek authorization once its military plans are complete. The resolutions could 
“constitute an almost unlimited mandate to use force.”229 On the other hand authors saw 
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that USA attacks violated international law as it is not authorized by the Council. They 
said that the Resolution ends by mentioning that the Council “remains seized of the 
matter” which means according to United Nations correspondent Phyllis Bennis, that the 
decision making is only in the hand of the Council to decide measures appropriate for the 
situation.
230
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III. Afghanistan’s Responsibility on the Attacks of 9/11 under 
Article 2 (4) of the Charter 
   The U.S. exposed to one of the deadliest attacks ever happened in its history on the 
morning of September 11
th
 2001. Attack which caused about 3000 civilians killed and 
6000 injury. At his first speech to the American People, Bush accused al Qaeda, a 
terrorist organization activated in Afghanistan, for doing such horrific act.
231
 He 
characterized the attack as an “act of war.”232 Bush made it clear in his speech reserving 
his State position on the right to response in self-defense manner against any State 
“harboring” terrorist.233 The United States Representative member to the Council letter 
considered that it is subjected to an “armed attack” which consequently raises the right to 
act, according to Article 51, in a self-defensive manner. The letter mentions that the 
United States has the right to act in self-defense “following the armed attacks that were 
carried out against the US on 11 September 2001 (emphasis added).”234 This Chapter will 
examine whether there was an armed attack on the day of 9/11 or it was a use of force 
prohibited under Article 2 (4). Moreover, it will argue whether these attacks are 
attributable to the State of Afghanistan under ILC Drafted Articles, customary law and 
other international law materials.  
A. United States Position on the Criteria of 9/11 Attacks. 
   Although the U.S. did not clearly declare that Afghanistan is responsible for the armed 
attack, it stated in its letter to the Council that “al Qaeda had a central role in the attacks 
(emphasis added.”235 It added that “there is still much we do not know” as the issue still 
in its early stage.
236
 However, the U.S. letter to the council support that it was subjected 
to an “armed attack” on 9/11. The armed attack argument was supported by some 
European States when invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The U.S. strategy was 
not to declare that it has been subjected to an attack by terrorist militias but to attribute 
the 9/11 horrific attacks to the State of Afghanistan by linking al Qaeda with the 
government, Taliban.  
 
1. Whether there was an “Armed Attack.”  
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   Different arguments could be raised to support the U.S. claim that it has been subjected 
to an armed attack. European Sates supported to the U.S. claim when the North Atlantic 
Council invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its history, which 
explains that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all.
237
 The fact that the NATO 
invoked Article 5 is seen serious concern from the European body to the claim that the 
hijacking was not a terrorist attack but an “armed attack” which requires defensive 
measures under the United Nations Charter.
238
  
 
   The language of the two Security Council Resolutions adopted post 9/11 attacks could 
be understood as an “unlimited mandate to use force.”239 On 12 September 2001, in 
Resolution 1368, the Council strongly condemned the terrorist attack and expressed “its 
readiness to take all necessary steps.”240 Moreover, in 1373 Resolution, it was argued that 
the Council implicitly encouraged the United States to seek authorization to use its 
military force once it is ready.
241
 In the preamble paragraphs of both Resolutions, it is 
mentioned that the Council recognizes “the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations.” The references made in both 
resolutions to self-defense are interpreted that the acts of terrorism were recognized by 
the Council as “armed attacks.” Dinstein said, that if the right to “self-defense” is raised 
in both Resolutions, that means consequently that the Council recognizes the attack, 
which took place in 9/11 as “armed attack.”242 
   As mentioned in the previous Chapter, according to Oil Platform, an attack to count as 
armed does not have to take the shape of a massive military operation.
243
 Moreover, an 
attack does not have to be made by a State to consider it armed.
244
 Therefore, al Qaeda’s 
attack could consider under international law as armed even without the interference of 
the regular force of the government of Afghanistan. The reason why, United States and 
the United Kingdom, did not mention in any of their formal documents that the attack 
was executed by the State government of Afghanistan. The UK said, “Osama Bin Laden 
could not operate his terrorist activities without the alliance and support of the Taliban 
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regime (emphasis added).”245 In addition, the U.S. finds a connection between Taliban 
and al Qaeda when it mentioned in its letter to the Council “that Al Qaeda Organization 
which is supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan had a central role in the attack 
(emphasis added).”246 They did not claim that the attack was planned, or directed by the 
Afghani government; however, they still condemn the government of Afghanistan, 
Taliban, for their role in the attack that is “supporting, and harboring” al Qaeda terrorist 
organization. The U.S. shows that the support took the form of providing safe haven for 
the terrorist group in order to train, plan, and lunch their attacks.
247
  
   According to the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua, to consider the act by 
non-state actor as armed attack, it must have some criteria found together which are; the 
source of the attack in one hand, gravity, scale, and effect in the other hand.
248
 If only one 
criteria is found, the act could be considered as aggression, mere use of force, short of 
war, anything but an armed attack.
249
 Applying the Nicaragua test mentioned in the 
previous Chapter on the case here, the second test of scale and magnitude is definitely 
fulfilled. Attack that targeted the U.S. causing the two World Trade Center’s wreckage 
and Pentagon destruction causing a major number of casualties, would be seen grave in 
character indeed. The gravity of 9/11 attack can amount to an armed attack made by the 
regular army of the State of Afghanistan. The debatable test here is the first criteria, 
which is; whether al Qaeda is considered a de facto organ of the State, and that the 
attacks were made in behalf of the government which has a substantial involvement 
therein. Dinstein said that attacks by non-state actors still could constitute an armed 
attack even if it is not announced in behalf of the State. He referred to both Resolution 
405 and 419 (1977), when the Security Council referred to an “act of aggression” 
perpetrated by mercenaries against the State of Benin, without any suggestion that any 
other State was involved.
250
 However, the issue in 9/11 becomes more problematic, as 
mentioned in the previous paragraph; because neither did the U.S. nor the U.K. directly 
accused Taliban in their formal documents for carrying out the horrific attacks of 9/11.  
2. Attributing Afghanistan’s Responsibility 
   Although the first criterion of Nicaragua test, source of the attack, is questionable in 
the U.S arguments, some authors projected the view that the government responsibility of 
                                                          
245 UK REPORT ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TERRORIST ATROCITIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 11 SEPTEMBER 2001. 
246
 S/2001/946, U.S. Letter to the Security Council 
247 Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM J INT LAW, 905, 906 
(Oct. 2010). 
248
 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicar. v. U.S., I.C.J. 14, 
195, (June 27, 1986) 
249
 YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE,  211, (Cambridge University 
Press, 5
th
 ed., 2011) (1988). 
250
 Id, at 227. 
43 
 
the attack is found in other interpretations of the case. Steven R. Ratner drew Taliban’s 
responsibility on the attack based on the U.S. “toleration theory.”251 He based his 
argument on President Bush speech to the U.S. people in response to the event when said 
“[w]e will make no distinction between the terrorist who committed these acts and those 
who harbor them (emphasis added).”252 According to Ratner, the U.S. drew the link 
between al Qaeda and Taliban as the later allowed parts of its territory which it control to 
be used by the earlier as a base operation for training and planning for different attacks. 
Steven added that although Taliban is not directly responsible for the attacks, President 
Bush effectively imputes responsibility of the Afghani government as it harbored al 
Qaeda in its territory, therefore, the U.S. legal position is the right to attack in self-
defense the State of Afghanistan as it harbor the terrorist group accused for the attacks.
253
 
   Dinstein made a comparison between the responsibility of the government of Iran in 
1980 on the acts of militias, who were acting in their own initiative when they took over 
the U.S. Embassy staff as hostages in the case known as Iran Hostage, and the case of 
9/11.
254
 The International Court of Justice held that the acts of the militias are attributable 
to the government as the later “completely failed to take the means at its disposal to 
comply with its obligations under international law (emphasis added).”255  The Court held 
that the Iranian government is responsible considering that it should have taken 
appropriate measures to protect the interests of the U.S. while it has “means at its 
disposal” to do so. Therefore, Iran considered an inactive State, which bears international 
responsibility of non-state actor’s acts. On the other hand, Dinstein saw that although 
Taliban was not accomplices with 9/11 attacks, before or during the attacks, it still bears 
responsibility as it refused to take any measures against the terrorist, refused Bush’s 
demands to hand them over, and continued to offer them safe shelters in its territory.
256
       
   It seems that the U.S. government did not single out al Qaeda as its only targets.
257
 
Linking al Qaeda’s acts with Taliban made the argument that the government of 
Afghanistan did breach Article 2 (4), by using force in an armed attack toward another 
State member of the United Nations Charter, even more applicable. However before 
declaring the war, the U.S. asked the Afghani government to hand over bin Laden, the 
                                                          
251 Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM J INT LAW, 905, 908 
(Oct. 2010). 
252 Transcript of President Bush’s address, CNN, Sept. 21, 2001.  
253 Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM J INT LAW, 905, 908 
(Oct. 2010). 
254
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE,  261, (Cambridge University 
Press, 5
th
 ed., 2011) (1988).  
255
 Id. 
256
 Id. 
257
 MICHAEL BYERS, TERRORISM: THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AFTER 
SEPTEMBER 11, 408 (2010), 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5575&context=faculty_scholarship. 
44 
 
head of al Qaeda terrorist group. Bush in his speech alerted Taliban to deliver bin Laden 
when he said “[d]eliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda who 
hide in your land…these demands are not open to negotiation or discussion… they will 
hand over the terrorists or they will share in their fate.”258 Bush also gave Taliban two 
weeks to hand over bin Laden and his terrorist organization and when the time limit came 
into an end and still the U.S did not deliver bin Laden, as Taliban refused to hand him, 
the U.S declared the war and Afghanistan became the first battleground of the war on 
terror in the whole region.
259
 
B. Other Considerations on the Criteria of 9/11 Attacks. 
   The U.S. and U.K. claims on the criteria of 9/11 attacks had been confronted with other 
legal arguments. Authors criticized the U.S. letter to the Council that defines the attacks 
as “armed attacks.” The following part re-reads the arguments which support U.S. and 
U.K. claims on the criteria of 9/11 attacks. It also applies the Law Commission Drafted 
Articles on the responsibility of the government of Afghanistan on the attacks made by al 
Qaeda terrorist organization. 
1. Re-reading “U.S. and U.K. Letters to the Council, NATO invocation of 
Article 5, and Security Council 1368, 1373 Resolutions”  
   The U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, John Negroponte, mentioned 
in his letter to the Security Council that his State has the right to act in self-defense 
because of “the armed attacks that were carried out against the US on 11 September 
2001.”260 However, he did not directly mention who is responsible for this armed attack. 
As mentioned before, he stated in the letter that al Qaeda had a “central role” in the attack 
and that it was “supported” by Taliban. It was more confusing when he stated in the letter 
that the U.S. is still trying to proof who is responsible for the attacks as the investigation 
still “in its early stage.” Moreover, the U.K. letter to the Security Council justifying its 
military action mentioned that self-defensive measures will be directed toward al Qaeda 
and “the Taliban regime that is supporting it.”261 According to their documents, neither 
did the U.S. nor the U.K. asserted that the attacks were directed by the government of 
Taliban. Moreover, the U.S. claim that Taliban supported al Qaeda in the attacks was 
vague. No evidence was submitted or showed to any official body. Two weeks after the 
9/11 attacks, Secretary of State Colin Powell promised to show evidence of responsibility 
and the link between Taliban and al Qaeda on the attack, however, the U.S. decided that 
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it is not necessary to make public its evidence of responsibility.
262
 The U.K. also made a 
public report which state conclusions reached by the government on the responsibility of 
al Qaeda on the attacks supported by Taliban.
263
 However, the weakness of the report was 
concluded the next day by the BBC, which stated that “[t]here is no direct evidence in the 
public domain linking Osama Bin Laden to the 11 September attacks. At best the 
evidence is circumstantial.”264 
   The issue of linking Taliban with the attack became even more difficult when the Chief 
Spokesperson of Taliban condemned the attacks immediately and did not claim 
responsibly for them.
265
 Moreover, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan stated on October 
5, "[w]e are prepared to try [bin Laden] if America provides solid evidence of [his] 
involvement in the attacks on New York and Washington (emphasis added)."
266
 He also 
showed his government readiness to deliver bin Laden to a third State when evidence is 
provided. However, Washington responded that its demands were non-negotiable and 
refused to hand any evidence of responsibility.
267
 The inquire here is not to argue whether 
bin Laden committed the attacks or not, but to show to what extent did the U.S. and U.K. 
governments did not show any concrete evidence of responsibility to accuse neither al 
Qaeda for the attack, nor Taliban for the support. The evidence of responsibility should 
have been shown to everyone, “Washington might be satisfied with the evidence, but 
many others may not be.”268 
   Considering that NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty does not mean 
consequently that it is a European support that what happened on 9/11 is an “armed 
attack” under international law.269 There are other European bodies such as The 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which mentioned that the attacks were 
“criminal acts not acts of war.”It seems that NATO was motivated by other factors than 
the law in invoking Article 5, this was seen when the U.K. the NATO member, in its 
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documents did not refer to the attack as armed.
270
 The U.K. letter submitted to the 
Security Council in October 7 referred to the attack as an “operation of terror.”271 It 
seems that NATO’s invocation of Article 5, showing the right of States members to act 
collectively in self-defense whenever an armed attack happens, was over-weighted on the 
legal basis.
272
 In my opinion, NATO’s decision was based on political considerations 
rather than legal ones as the attacks of 9/11 had a wide spread sympathy.   
   It was discussed that according to both resolutions 1368, and 1373 when referred to the 
inherent right of self-defense, the Council recognized the attacks of 9/11 as “armed 
attacks.” This conclusion has some problems, as the Council never referred to the acts of 
9/11 as “armed attacks” in both resolutions. Even the Council member’s statements in the 
debate prior to the adoption of the resolutions did not refer to the attacks as armed.
273
 It 
was argued that the language of the Council could be interpreted as an open mandate to 
use force in self-defense in response to an armed attack, however, if the language of the 
Council in 2001 compared with 1990 language, regarding (Iraq v. Kuwait) war, a great 
conceptual differences will be seen. On 1990, the Council passed 661 Resolution which 
recognizes the inherent right of self-defense “in response to the armed attack by Iraq 
against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter (emphasis added).”274 It 
seems that the Council language was clear when it laid the responsibility directly on the 
aggressor State and did not escape accusing Iraq directly. It also gave Kuwait, the right to 
invoke self-defense under the justification of Article 51 and the permission of the 
Council.
275
 On the other hand, the paragraph of resolutions 1368 and 1373 only recognize 
and reaffirm “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” as recognized by 
the Charter. Mere difference is seen between both structures, in resolution 661 the 
Council used the term “armed attack” and specifically mentioned Article 51 of the 
Charter, which it did not do in post 9/11 resolutions. The comparison shows that in order 
to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council is prepared to use the 
specific term of “armed attack” only when it is convinced that an “armed attack” did 
actually occurred, therefore, the language adopted in both 1368 and 1373 resolutions 
shows that the Council was not convinced that 9/11 attacks were “armed attacks.” 
2. Attribution of Responsibility under both, Nicaragua test and Law 
Commission 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States 
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   According to Nicaragua test, acts of non-state actors could amount to an armed attack 
if both criteria of source, and gravity were fulfilled. The question of whether the terrorist 
attacks could be grave in nature or not is discussed in Part A.1. However, still the 
question of whether, according to U.S. and U.K. documents, Taliban’s support to al 
Qaeda could fulfill the first criteria of Nicaragua test, source of the attacks, and bear 
responsibility to the government of Afghanistan on it. The U.S. and U.K. arguments on 
the connection between Taliban and al Qaeda are based on the support given from 
Taliban to al Qaeda. However, the ICJ in Nicaragua mentioned that “provisions of 
weapons or logistical or other support” could not amount to an “armed attack.”276 Judge 
Jennings added that “mere provision of arms cannot be said to amount to an armed 
attack.”277The issue here is that the source of the attack is not clearly mentioned in both 
letters submitted to the Council by the U.S. and U.K. Both States did not mention that the 
terrorist attacks were sent by or on behalf of Taliban, to bear it responsible. They did not 
even identify what type of support is given by the government to al Qaeda other than 
allowing parts of its territory to be used by it. Under international law, the level of 
“support” referred to by the U.S. and U.K. is insufficient to amount 9/11 as an “armed 
attack” by the government of Afghanistan, Taliban. Neither there were evidence given to 
the Council nor there was a claim made that the attacks were directed by Taliban. 
        The Court in 2005 Armed Activities quoted Article 8 of International Law 
Commission’s 2001 Draft Articles when mentioned that to count the act as a conduct of 
the State, the attack must be lunched “on the instructions of, or under the direction or 
control of a given State.”278 Moreover, when the test of “effective control” of Nicaragua 
applies on the case here, it will not meet neither the U.S. “harboring theory” nor the U.K. 
claim of the government support to al Qaeda. The ICJ in Nicaragua stated that “general 
control” over non-state actors is not enough to bear the responsibility of a State on a 
certain act; the State must be in an “effective control” over the “military or paramilitary 
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.”279 The Court’s 
ruling means that, in order to bear responsibility of a State on a certain act, it has to be 
proven that the State directed and controlled that specific act. Furthermore, the Court saw 
that the U.S. supporting or aiding the Contra’s rebel group could be considered as a use 
of force but not as an armed attack.
280
 On the same scale given, my opinion is that if the 
evidence submitted proved that Afghanistan supported and provided safe haven to al 
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Qaeda, Taliban could be accused for violating the principle of non use of force mentioned 
in Article 2 (4), as it harbored al Qaeda in its territory, but not committing an “armed 
attack” under Article 51, as it did not exercise effective control over al Qaeda in the 9/11 
operation. 
   The International Law Commission adopted a very similar approach of the Nicaragua’s 
test on the attribution of State responsibility. According to Article 8, the conduct of non-
state actors is attributable to the State if they were “acting on the instructions of, or under 
the direction or control of that state in carrying out the conduct.”281 It was mentioned 
before that the U.S. and U.K. documents did not alleged that the attack was under the 
direction or control of Taliban. Although Taliban was welcomed by the majority of the 
Afghani people and established an effective control over most of its territory, as it could 
offer some stabilization to the State, still it is not considered as a dominant government 
which have the power over all of its territory, the thing is that Taliban also could not bear 
responsibility under the Corfu Channel test.
282
 Taliban did not “allow knowingly its 
territory to be used” by al Qaeda in order to attack the United States. This is shown in the 
condemnations made by the government immediately post the attacks of 9/11, and the 
promise to contribute in bringing responsible into justice.
283
 Unlike Tehran Hostage case, 
Taliban did not adopt the attack as its own, Aijaz Ahmad in his book “Iraq, Afghanistan 
and the Imperialism of Our Time” said that linking Taliban with the attack is hard 
because “they denounced the attack immediately and promised in no uncertain terms to 
help find the culprits.”284 Therefore the attack of 9/11 could not be attributed to 
Afghanistan on the bases of Article 11 of the Law Commission Draft Articles.
285
 Also 
Taliban did not have “means at its disposal” to protect the interests of the U.S. and 
prevent the attack of 9/11, therefore it also cannot bear responsibility on the precedent set 
forth in Tehran Hostage.       
C. Conclusion. 
   The question of whether the U.S. was subjected to an “armed attack” at the morning of 
9/11 is doubtful. The arguments which support the claim that the attack was armed, 
analyzes the invocation of Article 5 by NATO as a support from the European States that 
the hijacking was “armed attacks.” However, NATO’s invocation of Article 5 was 
influenced by political considerations rather than legal basis. In addition, there were other 
European bodies, which acknowledged the attacks as “criminal acts” not armed ones. 
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Therefore it cannot be argued that 9/11 attacks are armed as the European States 
recognized them as “armed attacks” when invoked Article 5 of the NATO. This argument 
is overstated.  
  Although, there is an argument that the Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, 
when referred to the inherent right of self-defense, consider 11 September attacks as 
armed attacks. The Council, in both resolutions, had never used the term “armed attacks” 
nor directly referred to Article 51. Comparing both resolutions to resolution 661 (Kuwait 
v. Iraq), the Council does not seem ready to count the 9/11 acts as “armed attacks.” I also 
believe that the Council did not recognize 9/11 attacks as armed attacks because neither 
the U.S. nor the U.K were seen ready to submit any document to proof the responsibility 
of Taliban on al Qaeda’s attacks. Consequently, the Council was not sure that 9/11 
attacks were “armed attacks” by the State of Afghanistan, and considering its main role in 
maintain international peace and security, it did not clearly mention in both resolutions 
that the U.S. has the right to self-defense under Article 51 as it was exposed to an armed 
attack, unlike the case for Kuwait on 1990.     
   Moreover, according to Nicaragua, both “source and gravity” tests must be fulfilled to 
consider the attack as armed, however, only the test of gravity was fulfilled in the 9/11 
attacks. Taliban was not in “effective control” over al Qaeda’s operation, in order to 
attribute the terrorist attacks to it, and according to ILC Articles on Responsibility of 
States neither did Article 8 nor Article 11 fit the position of Taliban as it condemned the 
act immediately and promised to help find the criminals responsible, furthermore, the 
U.S. and the U.K did not prove that Taliban sent the terrorist groups to attack on behalf of 
the State of Afghanistan. Taliban also asked to surrender bin Laden and help in finding 
the terrorist responsible when evidence is submitted, however, the U.S. government 
refused this offer on the basis that evidence are classified. Moreover, there was neither a 
claim made by the U.S. government nor the U.K. that the attack was directed or 
controlled by the government of Afghanistan. In their documents, they both claimed that 
Taliban is responsible as it “harbor” al Qaeda in its territory, and according to Nicaragua 
test; general control, supporting arms or harboring terrorists do not amount to an armed 
attack, an “effective control” is needed over the terrorist group on the specific operation 
in question. However, U.S. and U.K. did not proof that connection. Therefore, the 
Nicaragua definition of armed attack, extent of control, and attribution are not satisfied in 
the case.  
   According to U.S. and U.K. claim that Taliban did “support” al Qaeda and offered it 
shelters on its territory, Afghanistan could be condemned for breaching the prohibition of 
non-use of force in Article 2 (4), if evidence is supported. Afghanistan might be 
responsible under international law for al Qaeda’s attacks; however, as mentioned before, 
responsibility of States under international law varies according to the role of the State, 
and the graveness of the attacks. In Nicaragua, the court stated that the U.S. supporting 
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and aiding Contras might be a use of force but does not amount to an armed attack. In 
Tehran Hostage, the government of Iran was responsible as it had means at its disposal 
but did not take measures to safeguard U.S. interests. In the case of Afghanistan, 
according to the U.S. arguments, the government role in 9/11 attacks was supporting and 
harboring al Qaeda, therefore it might be accused for a mere use of force, aggression, 
short of war, but its role in 9/11 does not amount to an armed attack. Also when 
compared to Tehran Hostage, Afghanistan did not has means at its disposal to stop 9/11 
attacks. Afghanistan did not know all Qaeda’s intent of attacking the U.S. because it does 
not control all of its territory. 
   On the other hand, the U.S. and the U.K. did violate Article 2 (4) when attacked 
Afghanistan acting in self-defense under Article 51 as they did not prove clearly the 
attribution of the attack to the government, and because the elements of “armed attack” 
were still not satisfied. Therefore, the act made by the U.S. and U.K. is not a lawful act of 
self-defense under international law as the attacks of 9/11 are not “armed attacks” under 
international law. 
                 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
IV. The Legality of the U.S. and U.K. Use of Force under Article 
51    
   It was concluded in the previous Chapter that 9/11 attacks were not armed attacks 
which consequently functions the use of force in self-defense under Article 51 of the 
Charter. However, such as any other State, the U.S. when used force in attacking 
Afghanistan, it invoked the argument of self-defense in its letter to the Security Council 
and other political statements. According to 2005 Armed Activities the violation which 
does not fall under the armed attack’s pattern is not covered by Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter. Article 51 states that “[n]nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations.”286 This Chapter will argue other legal strategies seen in 
the U.S. and U.K. documents, which justifies their attacks on 7 October under Article 51. 
Then it will argue whether the customary law requirements of self-defense were fulfilled 
in the attacks or not.  
A. U.S. and U.K. Arguments Justifying their Use of Force  
  Still the official documents of both governments of the U.S. and U.K. could be 
formulated on other legal basis of self-defense to justify their attacks on 7 October. This 
Part will discuss the argument of anticipatory self-defense seen in the U.S. Congress 
Legislation, letter to the Council, U.K. government report on 9/11 attack, and its letter to 
the Security Council. In addition, it will discuss in brief other grounds for the U.S. and 
U.K. that they might invoke to justify their attacks on Afghanistan. 
1. Anticipatory Self-defense Arguments 
   The argument of anticipatory self-defense was seen in the U.S. and the U.K letters to 
the Security Council. Also the U.S. Congress adopted The Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force Resolution which permit the President to use force to protect the nation 
from future attack, as there are evidence in 9/11 Commission Report that the terrorists are 
willing to commit future attacks toward the US.
287
 In the report of the U.K. government, 
Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, Blair showed evidence 
that his State has the right to attack Afghanistan as the terrorist groups are willing to 
commit further attacks.
288
  
a. U.S Letter to the Council and Congress Legislation  
                                                          
286
 U.N. CHARTER, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24, 
1945.  
287
 US 107th Congress, 1st Session, SJ Res 23, (2001).  
288
 UK REPORT ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TERRORIST ATROCITIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 11 SEPTEMBER 2001. 
52 
 
   In response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Congress passed S.J.Res. 23 which 
allows the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons.”289 The US intent to use force in anticipatory self-defense was clear in the 
resolution when the permission was given to the President “in order to prevent any future 
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or 
persons (emphasis added).”290 According to the Congress Legislation, the U.S. has the 
right not only to attack Afghanistan because of the 9/11 armed attacks, but also to protect 
its people from any future attacks that might come. The Congress was justifying the use 
of force in anticipatory self-defense to the U.S. President.  
   Evidence of al Qaeda’s responsibility on the attack and its willingness to commit 
further attacks was referred to in both FBI and CIA interrogations for its members in 9/11 
Commission Report.
291
 Also the U.S. President stated in his speech that the U.S. 
government has classified evidence of responsibility of al Qaeda on the attack and the 
support provided from Taliban.
292
 However, when asked the government of Afghanistan 
to deliver al Qaeda’s leaders, he refused to show evidence when said that his demands are 
“not open to negotiation or discussion.”293 In addition, it was remarkable in his 
statements of policy on “anticipatory self-defense” that the U.S. government is willing to 
counter terrorist threats before even they plan a concrete action, a policy which named 
“Bush Doctrine.”294   
   In its letter to the Security Council, the U.S stated that it was responding to the 
“ongoing threat to the United States and its nationals.”295 Also the U.S. justification of 
the attacks was in order to “prevent and deter further attacks on the United States.” The 
U.S. letter shows that the intent in its actions in Afghanistan was coupled by its argument 
of preventing future loss. According to the US, the actions of self-defense under Article 
51 might need other requirements “[w]e may find that our self-defense requires further 
actions with respect to other organizations and other States.”296 The other requirements 
are, acting in self-defense against the armed attack of 9/11 coupled with preventing future 
attacks. Therefore the representative letter showed that the U.S. actions in Afghanistan 
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were designed “to prevent and deter further attacks on the United States.”297 According to 
the U.S. letter to the Security Council and the Congress legislation, it was seen that not 
only the U.S. was acting in a self-defensive manner because of the armed attack 
happened in 9/11, but also it was acting in anticipatory self-defense in order to prevent 
any future threat.  
b. U.K. Letter to the Council and HMG’s Report 
   Unlike the U.S, the UK letter to the Security Council shows that its justification of 
using force was not a “direct response to the events of 11 September 2001 per se.”298 In 
other words the U.K. letter shows that, when deployed force, it was not acting only in 
response to the 9/11 attacks, there were other justifications for its use of force. The letter 
stated that the force used was “to avert the continuing threat of attacks from the same 
source [Afghanistan] (emphasis added).”299 The thing is that the U.K raised the argument 
of anticipatory self-defense directly when it joined the U.S. in attacking Afghanistan on 7 
October. The justification of using force was drawn clearly in preemptive manner to stop 
“continuing threats of attacks” from al Qaeda. Moreover, Mr. Blair in his speech to the 
British people said that “we have a direct interest in acting in our self-defense to protect 
British lives.''
300
 Mr. Blair clearly drew his government role in the attack, as it is not just 
acting collectively with the U.S, but also acting in the British people’s interests in 
protecting them from future attacks.
301
 
   According to interrogations and evidence, the U.K. government report on 9/11 attacks, 
HMG’s Report, concluded that the attacks were planned and carried out by al Qaeda 
terrorist organization coupled with a support from the Taliban regime.
302
 It stated that in 
the future the organization has the will to commit further attack against the British people 
“[t]hat organization has the will…to execute further attacks…Both the United States and 
its close allies are targets for such attacks (emphasis added).”303 The report shows that 
one of the main key of the attack is protecting its nation from future attacks, the thing that 
is considered an argument to anticipatory self-defense. The U.K. when attacking 
Afghanistan, it was acting to prevent “further attacks” by the organization accused for 11 
September attacks. In addition, the Report stated that the British government has 
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evidence of al Qaeda’s responsibility of the attack and its intention to execute future 
ones. The actions of both U.K. and U.S. were seen anticipatory in nature.
304
         
    Although the U.S. intention to use force in anticipatory self-defense was clear, it did 
not explicitly raised this argument directly in its official documents. They referred to the 
argument of, the probability that the terrorist group might commit future attacks, but it 
did not state it clear that their governments have the right to act in anticipatory self-
defense. The reason is that anticipatory self-defense doctrine is not accepted by the 
majority of States and is not acceptable under Article 51, only when coupled with other 
customary law requirements.
305
 However former Secretary of State, George Shultz, did 
not accept that the argument of self-defense could not be used to prevent future attacks 
when said “[i]t is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing 
terrorists in international waters or airspace; from attacking them on the soil of other 
nations.”306 In Nicaragua, the Court did “shied away” from addressing anything about 
anticipatory self defense, however, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Schwebel rejected a 
reading that Article 51 is only applicable “if, and only if, an armed attack occurs.”307 I 
also think that concept which prohibits anticipatory self-defense entirely is not realistic. 
Preventing States from deterring imminent act of aggression will not fulfill the Charter 
main goal of maintaining peace and security. In contrary, the damage caused to a State 
waiting until the requirements of an armed attack are complete might exceeded the 
damage of anticipatory attack to stop an aggression. However, I still support that 
anticipatory self-defense should have certain conditions to be lawful under international 
law.   
   Authors such as Dinstein thinks that even supporters of anticipatory self-defense 
doctrine must concede that the probability of future attacks based on false evidence will 
accelerate, which consequently will trigger the right of self-defense to prevent an attack 
even if it did not hold a serious threat at all. However, considering September 11 attacks, 
Dinstein thought that the “grave nature” of the attacks justified the use of force in 
anticipatory self-defense, even when there is no immediate need to carry out these 
attacks, to elaborate non-state actors terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda, which formed, 
according to his argument, an “instant customary international law” due to the presence 
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of the global terrorism phenomena.
308
 He thinks that the global concerns of terrorism 
worldwide alerted the need to embrace new norms and laws in order to be capable of 
fighting this danger which he discussed as a formation of new “instant customary” rules.  
2. Other Possible Legal Justifications for the Use of Force in Self-defense 
   Scholars raised different arguments which the U.S. and the U.K. could relied upon 
when used force in self-defense. Michel Byers stated that there are three arguments for 
both States, other than invoking the inherent right of self-defense to justify their use of 
force. These arguments are the Security Council authorization, humanitarian intervention, 
and intervention by invitation.
309
 This part will discuss these three legal justifications in 
brief.  
a. Security Council Authorization 
   In resolution 1386, the Council strongly condemned the 9/11 attacks but did not 
directly authorized force, however,  it was argued that the Council words when showed 
“its readiness to take all necessary steps” is understood as an implicit encouragement for 
the U.S. to use its military army, acting in self-defense, whenever it is ready.
310
 On 28 
September the language of the Council in resolution 1373 could be argued as an “almost 
unlimited mandate to use force.”311 Byers clarified his point by mentioning that the 
resolution should not be read as a direct authorization to use force, however, it provides 
the U.S. with a tenable argument, for political reasons, when it decides to use force to 
prevent terrorist attacks.
312
 He added that, in resolution 1373, the Council when stated 
that all States shall take “necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts” gave 
this benefit to other States, to invoke resolution 1373 and block terrorist attacks.
313
 
   Still the U.S. did not argue that its use of force was based on an implicit Security 
Council authorization.
314
 It did not rely on resolution 1373 while using force because of 
the fact that China and Russia could also rely on it in the future when use of force. Also 
the U.S. government might thought that relying on the phrase “all necessary steps” would 
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fail, as the Council mainly uses clearer and stronger language when authorize the use of 
force.
315
 
b. Humanitarian Intervention  
   After the 9/11 attacks, both the U.S. President and U.K. Prime Minister always tend to 
use human rights and humanitarian situations in Afghanistan.
316
  President Bush in his 
address to the U.S. people while accusing al Qaeda terrorist group for the attack, he 
mentioned that Taliban is not “only repressing its own people, it is threatening people 
everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists.”317 The President 
added while explaining the link between both Taliban and al Qaeda that “[b]y aiding and 
abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder.”318 Moreover, in its letter to 
the Council, the U.S. offered help by providing the Afghani people with “food, medicine, 
and supplies.” These assertions when seen in the context of the President statements 
could form a passage that the U.S. thought about invoking humanitarian intervention 
argument.
319
 
   Blair in his speech also referred to humanitarian arguments when mentioned that he 
“believe[s] the humanitarian coalition to help the people of Afghanistan to be as vital as 
any military action itself (emphasis added).”320 He added that his government with the 
U.S. will “do what can to minimize the suffering of the Afghan people (emphasis 
added).”321 It was seen after the 9/11 attacks that both administrations frequently 
regarded Taliban’s human right abuses in women’s dress, religious restrictions, food 
supplies, and educational problems.
322
 
   Neither did the U.S. government nor the U.K. base their arguments of the use of force 
on human right intervention doctrine.
323
 Maybe it would reduce its ability to use force or 
maybe because most human rights abuses provide no legal basis for military 
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intervention.
324
 It seems that both administrations were aware that invoking the argument 
of humanitarian intervention in response to an armed attack would probably preclude this 
claim from the outset.
325
  
c. Intervention by Invitation 
   According to Article 20 of the International Law Commission Drafted Articles on 
Responsibility of State, the U.S. can intervene in the territory of Afghanistan based on the 
latter’s consent providing that the U.S. actions “remains within the limits of that 
consent.”326 The U.S. government could have recognized North Alliance as the 
government of Afghanistan and seek its authorization to use force in its territory.
327
  It 
could have regarded Taliban as rebel group as it was only recognized by three States and 
rose to power recently.
328
 However, the U.S. did not seek this justification because it was 
not clear which regime is the legitimate government in representing the State of 
Afghanistan.
329
 Also according to Article 20 the U.S. action in Afghanistan should 
“remain within the limits of that consent” which will might cause a reluctant in the U.S. 
actions. 
   The U.S. did not rely on any of these justifications when attacked Afghanistan. If it 
relied on one of these arguments, other States would probably object, because according 
to the previous cases of fighting terrorism, international support for such arguments was 
missing.
330
 However, the nature of the situation in 11 September gave the U.S. an 
opportunity to choose to invoke its inherent right of self defense according to the United 
Nations Charter rather than applying any other justification.
331
 It was a strategic choice 
by the U.S. government to justify its attacks under self-defense in order to lose the legal 
constrains found in other humanitarian intervention, Council authorization, and, 
intervention by invitation arguments.
332
 The question left here is whether the U.S. and the 
U.K. escaped all the legal constrains when invoked their right to self-defense.   
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B. Counter Arguments of the U.S. and U.K. Justifications to Use Force 
   The arguments raised by both administrations on the future threats which threaten both 
States and the inevitability to use force to eliminate these threats are seen illegal 
considering the weak evidence presented by both bodies. Also, for the sake of the 
argument, if 11 September is an armed attack which gives the right to the U.S. to act 
according to Article 51, still self-defense under international law needs other customary 
law requirements to be lawful. This part will argue the weak basis of both the U.S. and 
the U.K. in justifying their anticipatory self-defense claim. Also it will assume that the 
U.S. had the right to act in self-defense then will argue whether this right was applied 
correctly according to international law. 
1. The Legality of the U.S. and U.K. Anticipatory Self-defense Claims 
   Policy statements made by both the U.S. and U.K. administrations show that they draw 
the justification of their act not only as they were exposed to an armed attack, but also on 
the justification of preventing future attacks, anticipatory self-defense claim.
333
 
a. Anticipatory Self-defense under Customary Law 
   There is a “restrictive approach” that under Article 51, a State could not invoke self-
defense unless the other State has already made a full armed attack.
334
 This approach 
means that States can invoke their right to self-defense only when an armed attack with 
sufficient magnitude, satisfies the requirements of responsive self-defense under Article 
51, has occurred.
335
 Scholars which support this restrictive view relay on the overall goal 
of the United Nation Charter in “maintaining international peace and security” by 
limiting the capability of States to use force in every dispute.
336
 However, it is 
unreasonable that States should wait and witness the launching of an armed attack while 
they are not able to invoke their right to repel it. State might plot into a serious damage if 
it followed this restrictive approach. However another more concrete customary 
approach, which I also agree with, was seen in the 1837 Caroline incident. 
   It is frequently argued that the legal application of anticipatory self-defense is traced 
back in 1837 Caroline incident, when the U.S. Secretary of State at that time, Daniel 
Webster, made the claim that for self-defense to be admitted it is required to “show a 
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necessity of self defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of mean, and no 
moment of deliberation.”337 It is understood from Webster’s doctrine that international 
law permits anticipatory self-defense in another State territory only when there is 
necessity of self-defense and when the attack is imminent. This doctrine is widely 
accepted as an “authoritative customary international law.”338 
   Although Caroline endorsed anticipatory self-defense, still there are constrains which 
face the application of it according to the requirements given in Webster’s doctrine.339 
Waldock said, for a legal application of anticipatory self-defense doctrine, there must be 
“convincing evidence…of an armed attack being actually mounted…though it has not 
passed the frontier (emphasis added).”340 Anticipatory self-defense is limited based on the 
necessity of the military action knowing that the attack is overwhelming; these limitations 
require solid evidence to proof its existence.
341
 The evidence must be proven by the State 
claiming its right to use force, according to Oil Platform, the burden of proof for the 
existence of an armed attack rests on the State invoking its right to self-defense.
342
  
   My opinion on the “formation of a legal anticipatory self-defense” is that it must be 
based on solid evidence, gathered by concrete intelligence, submitted by the State victim, 
to the international body concerned, that an armed attack is overwhelming. Like what 
was stated by Dinstein, in order to invoke the right to self-defense, it is not sufficient to 
wait for “the bombs to fall – or…fire to open”, however, the victim State has the right to 
invoke Article 51 even when the armed attack at “an incipient stage” once its solid 
intelligence proved that an “attack is actually in the process of being mounted.”343 
Dinstein name this type of anticipatory legal actions as interceptive self-defense.
344
 
b. Applying the Justifiable Anticipatory Self-defense on the U.S. and U.K. Acts. 
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   One might say that the evidence collected by FBI and CIA proves a future threat toward 
the U.S. justifying its anticipatory self-defense. As mentioned before, Colin Powell 
promised to show evidence of responsibility and then withdrew his promise.
345
 Seymour 
Hersh, a political writer, citied officials from both FBI and CIA stating that the reason 
why evidence of responsibility was not announced is the “lack of solid evidence.”346 
Moreover, U.S politicians always refer to the 9/11 Commission Report and the 
information it has, considering al Qaeda’s intention to commit future attacks.347 
Whenever the Commission refers to any evidence, it always cites evidence gathered by 
the FBI and CIA interrogations of al Qaeda and Taliban operatives in prison.
348
 NBC 
quoted Michael Ratner, the president of the Center for Constitutional Rights, when 
doubted the concreteness of the evidence gathered, he said “[m]ost people look at the 
9/11 Commission Report as a trusted historical document. If their conclusions were 
supported by information gained from torture, their conclusions are suspect.”349 It seems 
that the evidence cited in 9/11 Law Commission, which was not submitted to any 
international official body lacks credibility. That means that it could not be relied upon 
when invoking an anticipatory self-defense right and use armed force in attacking another 
State. 
   One might say that although the Commission Report evidence are not concrete enough, 
still the U.S. finds its justification to attack Afghanistan in the Congress authorization to 
the President to use force, and the evidence stated in the British government report of 
future threat by al Qaeda. Considering the Congress Legislation to use force, it is 
discussed in Chapter II the nature of the prohibition to use force as a preemptory norm. 
Article 44 (5) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, shows the nature of a jus 
cogens norm and how other norms could not prevail it. The article states, “if only part of 
a treaty conflicts with an existing jus cogens the whole of the treaty is void.”350 Applying 
this concept on the Congress Legislation it could be concluded that the legislation to use 
force is contrary to international law rules, therefore is void. The Congress authorized the 
President to use force without an authorization from the international body concerned, 
Security Council, and without supporting evidence presented, neither to public nor to any 
international body, of responsibility or future threat to the U.S. people. According to 
Article 39, the Council is the only body concerned to authorize the use of force 
internationally. Congress Legislation contradicts the Charter rules and the jus cognes 
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norm of the prohibition to use force, therefore void. Moreover, a vote in the national 
legislation could not override international obligations justifying a State to act contrary to 
international law.
351
 Considering the conclusion reached by the British government of the 
terrorist organization intent to commit future attacks, the weakness in the report was 
concluded by the BBC the next day when said that the report has “no direct evidence in 
the public domain linking Osama Bin Laden to the 11 September attacks (emphasis 
added).”352 Subsequently, also the report has no direct evidence of al Qaeda or Taliban’s 
intention to commit future attacks against the U.K. or the U.S.         
   The U.S. and the U.K. based their arguments of anticipatory self-defense on weak 
evidence. In 9/11 Commission Report, the evidence of the terrorist organization intent to 
commit future attacks was doubtful as it was argued that members of al Qaeda were 
tortured during interrogations in order to give information. After re-reading the British 
government report on 9/11, it was concluded that there are no direct evidence presented 
on the future threat argument. Also Congress Legislation could not be seen as a ground 
for the justification of the attack. The U.S. and U.K. “used force in self defense to prevent 
non-imminent future attacks” based on weak evidence.353 In order to consider an 
anticipatory self-defense legal, it must be proved by the State victim that an armed attack 
is overwhelming according to concrete evidence submitted to the body concerned. The 
U.S. and U.K. use of force could not be seen as a legal application of anticipatory self-
defense under international law.  
2. U.S. and U.K did not Satisfy Customary Law Requirements of Self-defense 
   According to Chapter II, it was discussed that although necessity, proportionality, and 
immediacy are not stated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter as requirements of 
self-defense, they are still considered “limits on all self defense, individual and 
collective.”354 Assuming that what happened in 9/11 was an armed attack satisfies all its 
requirements giving the right to the U.S. to invoke self-defense under Article 51, still 
State acting in self-defense under international law should satisfy the requirements stated 
in Webster’s formula. Thomas Frank said, “for the purpose of argument, the September 
11 attack could be construed to be an armed attack. U.S. would still have to meet the tests 
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of necessity and proportionality in order to qualify as self-defense.” This part will discuss 
whether the U.S. exercised its right to self-defense within the bounds of necessity, 
proportionality, and immediacy. 
a. Necessity 
   U.S. and U.K use of force must be exercised under the necessity provision. The use of 
force must have been instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means. In other words, 
the US must have worked hard to avoid the war and found other peaceful diplomatic 
solutions.
355
 The threat of an immediate attack against the U.S. had “subside” after 11 
September attacks.
356
 Moreover, as concluded earlier, the U.S. and U.K when acted in a 
self-defense manner, their arguments were to prevent future threats, as they were not 
under a full-scale armed attack back then. Therefore, the force used in self-defense 
cannot be seen under customary requirement of necessity, as a reason to stop an 
imminent threat of armed attack because there are no instant threats.  
   The efforts made by the U.S. in order to end the dispute in peaceful means were not 
serious. Taliban was welling to surrender bin Laden, the head of al Qaeda terrorist 
organization, if evidence were provided. The Taliban ambassador to Pakistan showed that 
Taliban could put bin Laden into trail even before the evidence is shown by the U.S. 
administration when said "[u]nder Islamic law, we can put him on trial according to 
allegations raised against him and then the evidence would be provided to the court."
357
 
However, Bush twice refused Taliban’s offer to turn bin Laden to third State, he 
demanded to hand over bin Laden immediately and unconditionally “dead or alive.”358 
He also stated that the U.S. “demand are not open for negotiation” when asked by the 
government of Afghanistan to hand evidence of responsibility.
359
 The U.S. leaders 
seemed not ready to negotiate to reach a peaceful solution.  
   According to necessity condition, the U.S. should have presented the evidence of bin 
Laden’s responsibility, and negotiated the possibility of his extradition or submitting him 
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into a trial.
360
 However, it seems that the U.S. did not negotiate with the government of 
Afghanistan in a good faith.
361
 The evidence suggests that the U.S. already has taken the 
decision to use force when it warned a war since the U.S. President first speech when said 
“[d]eliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda…or… share in their 
fate.”362 The U.S. efforts to solve the dispute peacefully were not seen genuine but an act 
of “ritual punctilio.”363  
   The necessity to use force in self-defense did not exists in 7 October U.S. operation 
against Afghanistan, since there was no imminent attack.
364
 The fact that the U.S. acted in 
self-defense after three weeks from the 11 September attacks shows that the necessity 
was not “overwhelming.”365 Moreover, the U.S. did not take advantage of the time lag 
between the 11 September attacks and the 7 October operation to make serious attempts 
in finding other peaceful solutions other than war.
366
 There were a lot of opportunities for 
the U.S. and the U.K. to seek other peaceful options. However, the U.S. and the U.K 
chose to go to war.      
b. Proportionality 
   In the context of Jus ad bellum, it means, that the amount of force used in self-defense 
must be proportionate, and not too excessive, to the threatened harm.
367
 The self-defense 
must be only with the force necessary, nothing “unreasonable or excessive.”368 In the 
9/11 case, the inquiries which should be noticed by the U.S. is what are the threats and 
where they come from.
369
 The U.S. is under a threat which comes from al Qaeda terrorist 
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members as they hijacked domestic airplanes and used them as bombs to explode the 
World Trade Centers.
370
  
   In terms of threats caused by al Qaeda, and according to the future threat argument 
raised by the U.S, proportionate use of force would be the use of force not in terms of the 
original aggression, but the use of force required to “neutralize and deter future 
aggression” which might be caused in the future.371 In other words, the U.S. use of force 
should be parallel to the intensity of the future attacks predicted by al Qaeda or Taliban in 
order to deter or reduce them.
372
  
   In response to these threats, the U.S. used its entire military arsenal to attack al Qaeda 
campuses in the territory of Afghanistan.
373
 The attacks continued to expand to reach the 
civilians buildings and airports.
374
 It also expanded to include an aim to outset the 
Afghani government, Taliban, in order to install a new government.
375
 However when 
analyzing the 9/11 attacks, they were lunched from the U.S. soil, when the terrorist 
hijacked two domestic airplanes which were lunching from Northeastern United States 
airports heading to California. The terrorist committed the attacks of 9/11 were hidden in 
the U.S. territory.   
   The U.S and U.K attacks on October 7 were not reasonable, as the immediate threats 
seem to be from the terrorist “sleeping” in the U.S. soil.376It is not reasonable to attack 
terrorists in another territory for a threat caused by terrorists activated in the territory of 
the State acting in self-defense. Also the objective of changing the regime in Afghanistan 
does not fit the reasonableness of the proportionality requirement, as the Taliban regime 
was still welcomed by the people of Afghanistan for providing some State stability.
377
 
This objective also contradicts the Charter’s self-determination purpose and the right of 
States to survive as sovereign entity stated in Article 1 (2).
378
 It would be more 
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reasonable to follow a strategy, which eliminate threats of terrorism from the U.S 
territory itself other than attacking Afghanistan.  
   Also the U.S. and U.K. attacks were excessive on the basis of time limit and number of 
casualties. In the sense of casualties numbers, it was argued by Marc W. Harold that  the 
number of civilians casualties caused by the U.S. and U.K. air bombing in Afghanistan 
exceeded the number of casualties in 9/11 attacks.
379
 However, the argument of 
comparing the numbers of casualties might be, to some extent, doubtful, as there are 
disagreements between studies on the number of casualties caused by the U.S. and U.K.  
invasion and whether the variations were considered as a reason of direct or indirect use 
of force “landmines, unexploded ordnances strikes and the long-term effects of 
warfare.”380 However, still the U.S and U.K. attacks in the territory of Afghanistan are 
excessive as they continued for 10 years. This expansion in time limit in order to 
eliminate future threat is not proportionate to the attacks of 9/11 or the argument of 
preventing further threats. 
   According to the U.S. and U.K, their legitimate purpose is to defeat al Qaeda terrorist 
organization in order to secure their territories from further threats. The lawfulness of the 
attack under proportionality standard is measured by the capacity of the U.S and U.K to 
achieve the desired result.
381
 However, the expansion of using force in self-defense to 
include overthrowing Taliban regime, attacking terrorist in another territory while the 
threats seem to be from terrorists in their own territory, the number of civilian casualties 
due to the excessive power used, and the expansion of the attack’s time limit does not 
stand as proportionate.
382
 Neither did the U.S. nor the U.K. follow the legal basis of using 
force proportionately in self-defense under Caroline standard.      
c. Immediacy. 
   According to Chapter II, immediacy does not mean that self-defense must be exercised 
while the armed attack is in progress.
383
 The State acting in self-defense still must be 
given a “reasonable” time to do its counter-measures.384 In other words, there must be no 
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“undue time-lag” between the armed attack and the use of force in self-defense.385 To 
conclude whether the U.S meet the immediacy standard of acting in self-defense, and 
whether the three weeks delay is still justified under immediacy standard of self-defense, 
I will apply the case on a two notable provisions given by Dinstein in his argument of 
immediacy in the war of self-defense.
386
 
   The first provision stated by Dinstein which has to be noticed while arguing the 
immediacy of any use of force under self-defense is that the “war of self-defense does not 
have to commence within a few minute, or even a few days, from the original armed 
attack.”387 In the context of 11 September attacks, it means that the U.S. is not suppose to 
shift to the status of war without been given a reasonable time to consider the 
measurements needed, whether to prepare its military equipments, doing negotiations 
between the Congress and the government on using its armed force, or studying the scale 
of the hostility.  Three weeks is a fair time for the U.S. to get ready to lunch its counter 
self-defense attack for its plans to eliminate the threats of terrorists. The use of force in 
self-defense in the Gulf War 1990 shows that the time lag could reach a half year and still 
the response is lawful under Caroline standards.
388
 However, according to Article 51 of 
the Charter, States have the right to use force in self-defense if there was “no moment of 
deliberation” until the Security Council is sized with the matter taking the necessary 
measures to maintain international peace and security.
389
 The Security Council made two 
resolutions, which did not authorize the use of force in self-defense, as will be discussed 
in detail in the next Chapter, but it called all States to work together and cooperate taking 
lawful measures in order to prevent terrorism future threats.
390
 According to the 
resolution; dialogue, diplomacy, or exchanging police information were seen the 
measurements imposed by the Council for the dispute.
391
 Therefore, although the three 
weeks time-lag between the terrorist attack and 7 October might be seen reasonable for 
the U.S. to prepare a counter attack, still neither the U.S was authorized by the Council to 
use force nor it seek peaceful settlement for the dispute in question, as it had more than a 
moment for deliberation to do so. 
   The second provision stated by Dinstein is that, even if the time between the original 
attack and the self-defense is longer than usual, still the immediacy standard is meet if the 
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delay in response is justifiable in the sense of trying peaceful negotiation for the 
dispute.
392
 In another words, if State A attacked State B, instead of using force acting in 
self-defense, State B could negotiate peacefully with State A to find other settlements for 
the dispute. If the negotiation between States failed, State B, the victim State, still has the 
right to invoke its use force in self-defense even if it took long time in the negotiation as 
long as serious peaceful attempts took place in this long period. In the case of 11 
September attacks, the U.S. indirectly refused to solve the dispute peacefully with the 
government of Afghanistan. The U.S refused to submit evidence of bin Laden’s 
responsibility to the Afghani government or to any official international body 
concerned.
393
 In addition, it refused the offer presented by the government’s ambassador 
in Pakistan to hand bin Laden to a third State when evidence is supported.
394
 The U.S. 
negotiations with the government of Afghanistan were not considered serious, as it lacks 
cooperation and transparency. In addition, there were no enough efforts made to 
determine whether the government of Afghanistan fulfilled the objectives of the U.S. or 
not.
395
 In that sense, the three weeks time lag is seen unreasonable stretching of time. The 
U.S delay in responding is not justifiable as it did not negotiate in order to maintain 
peace, but to show reasonableness of using force. U.S negotiations were a matter of 
political formalities to show peaceful intent.    
   Although immediacy might be reasonable in the sense of the time required for the U.S. 
to prepare for the attack in self-defense, still it might be considered unreasonable as it did 
not seriously seek peaceful negotiation and refuse every effort made during the time lag. 
It worth mentioning that there are arguments which believe that the U.S. immediacy 
standard was meet in 7 October, however they still argues that necessity and 
proportionality standard are not meet.
396
   
C. Conclusion 
   The U.S. did not act in legal self-defense under Article 51 when used force in 
Afghanistan on 7 October. According to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, States 
have the right to act in self-defense if it was subjected to an “armed attack”, however it 
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was concluded in Chapter III that 9/11 was not an armed attack triggering the right to act 
in self-defense according to Article 51.  
   The argument that the Congress legislation could stand, as a legal ground for the U.S. 
to attack Afghanistan is not accepted on two bases. Firstly, the prohibition to use force is 
a preemptory norm, therefore according to Article 44 (5) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, “if only part of” the Legislation contradicts “an existing jus cogens” 
the whole of the Legislation is “void.” In this case, the Congress authorized the President 
to use force, however it is not concerned with justifying the use of force on the 
international sphere, the only body which is concerned to authorize force internationally 
is the Security Council. Therefore, the Congress breached the general obligation of the 
“prohibition to use force” jus cogens norm when authorized the U.S. to use force contrary 
to the Council and consequently the whole of the Congress authorization is void. 
Secondly, States when joined the United Nations they accepted the laws of the Charter to 
exist in their policy and legal application of law whether in their national or international 
domain. Therefore, national legislations do not over ride already existing international 
law.   
   The U.S. and U.K. also raised the argument of “future threats” that might come from al 
Qaeda terrorist groups. According to the readings of the U.S. letter to the Council, the 
U.S. intent when attacking Afghanistan is to “prevent and deter further attacks on the 
United States.” Also the U.K. showed interests in attacking Afghanistan to “avert the 
continuing threat of attacks from the same source.” These two argument shows that both 
administrations intent was not only acting in self-defense as they were subjected to an 
armed attack, but also acting in anticipatory self-defense to prevent future attacks as they 
have evidence of the organization well to commit further attacks. As mentioned before I 
believe that anticipatory self-defense is legal under international law. It will not be logic 
that a State has to wait until an armed attack hits it causing damage then starts to invoke 
its right to self-defense under Article 51. However, I still believe that for an anticipatory 
self-defense to be legal it must be under these conditions; first is that the attack by the 
aggressor State should be overwhelming, second, is that the evidence of an overwhelming 
attack should be based on concrete evidence, third, these evidence should have been 
submitted to the international body concerned, Security Council. Applying these 
conditions on the case of 7 October attacks, it would not be legal for the U.S. or the U.K. 
to use force back then. 
   Analyzing the attacks of 9/11, the imminent threats of future attacks are seen from 
terrorist sleeping in the U.S. soil not from Afghanistan. The attacks of 9/11 were 
launched from the U.S. airport using domestic airplanes. However, there were no terrorist 
attacks launched from the territory of Afghanistan. The thing here is that Afghanistan 
does not seem to form an imminent threat to neither the U.S. nor the U.K territory in 
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order to see the attacks on 7 October as a legal anticipatory self-defense, and if it does 
form an imminent threat, concrete evidence should support the claim of an overwhelming 
attacks threats from the territory of Afghanistan to prove the legality of an anticipatory 
use of force by the US and UK. The U.S. cited evidence gathered by interrogations from 
FBI and CIA to al Qaeda’s operators in prison, however, these evidence are doubtful, as 
it was argued that prisoners said incorrect information as they were subjected to torture. It 
was also concluded that the British government report on 9/11 attacks HMG’s Report 
does not have any evidence of neither a direct responsibility of bin Laden on the attacks, 
nor his willingness to commit further ones. Moreover, if one's might be seen prejudiced 
on the U.S. claims on its evidence, still the U.S. does not seem ready to submit them to 
any other body even the Council. The U.S. letter to the Council notifies that it has 
“obtained clear and compelling information” on al Qaeda and Taliban responsibility on 
the attacks, however, they did not submit these evidence to the Security Council. When 
Afghanistan asked for evidence, the U.S. said that the evidence was classified. It seems 
that the U.S. took the decision of war since the first day when President Bush said 
“[d]eliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda…or… share in their 
fate.”  
   Although I support the legitimacy of anticipatory self-defense in general, still there are 
three main conditions must have been followed to justify its application, which were not 
followed by the U.S. prior to the use of force on 7 October. First, the future 
overwhelming argument was not satisfied, as the threats seems to be from inside the U.S. 
and no threats were seen from the territory of Afghanistan. Secondly, if the U.S. believes 
that future threats might come from the territory of Afghanistan, these claims must be 
concrete evidence based on hard intelligence. However, the U.S. citied evidence in 9/11 
Commission Report which were gathered by torturing al Qaeda’s members and are 
considered doubtful. The U.K. Government Report stated that Afghanistan forms future 
threats toward its nation, however, no direct evidence proved this claim in the report. 
Finally, the evidence of imminent attacks, that might justify the use of force in 
anticipatory, should have been submitted to the Security Council; however, the U.S. 
claimed confidentiality. U.S. and U.K. attacks on Afghanistan do not seem as a legal 
application of anticipatory self-defense.        
   Finally, if 9/11 was seen as an armed attack which justifies the U.S. to act in self-
defense according to Article 51, still necessity, proportionality, and immediacy in 
Caroline standards must be meet. Although the satisfaction of immediacy standard is 
negotiable, still the U.S. attacks were not necessary or proportionate. It might be argued 
that the three weeks delay is a reasonable time lag for the U.S. to reconsider its military 
status; however, it still did not use this time to peacefully settle the dispute. Moreover, the 
U.S and U.K attacks were not a response to instant, overwhelming threats, and that 
narrowed all the other options but to go to war. It seems that there was no overwhelming 
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attack, the threat of further ones had subside after the 9/11 attacks, therefore to support its 
argument under Caroline necessity condition, the US had to try other peaceful forms to 
deter future attacks. Although Taliban was welling to hand over bin Laden or put him 
into trial when evidence submitted of his responsibility, the U.S. refused any negotiation 
with Afghanistan when the President said “demands are not open to negotiation or 
discussion.” The U.S. had other choice of means to settle the dispute peacefully. 
However, its efforts were not considered serious but a matter of “ritual punctilio.” 
   The U.S. and U.K. attacks on 7 October must fulfill another condition of Caroline 
which is proportionality. The attacks were not proportionate to neutralize and deter future 
attacks argument by both administrations. The U.S. attacks were heavy as it used most of 
its military arsenal in the territory of Afghanistan. Moreover, the number of the casualties 
caused and the extension in the period of the attacks over 10 years could not seen 
proportionate. Moreover, proportionality is measured by the capacity to achieve the 
objective needed, the argument of the U.S. to overthrow the Taliban regime does not fall 
under proportionality. It is an excessive unneeded exercise of power toward the 
government of Afghanistan; it contradicts also a concrete rule of the Charter, which is the 
right of States to survive as sovereign entity. Therefore the attacks are not proportionate 
to the threat claimed by both administrations, they exceeded the objective of deterring 
further attacks. 
   To sum it all up, U.S. and U.K. attacks are not legal self-defense under international 
law because of three arguments. First the U.S. was not subjected to an “armed attacks” on 
9/11 which trigger the right to invoke self-defense under Article 51. The attacks were 
anything but armed; therefore, other measurements could have taken place rather than 
using force on 7 October. Secondly, U.S. did not strengthen the claim of its right to attack 
Afghanistan as an application of anticipatory self-defense to prevent future attacks. It was 
concluded that threats of an attack from the territory of Afghanistan were not imminent. 
Moreover, it seems that neither the U.S. nor the U.K. had solid evidence of an 
overwhelming attack to submit to the international body concerned to prove legitimacy of 
the anticipatory self-defense. Finally, it was assumed that if 9/11 was an armed attack 
which gives the U.S. the right to use armed force in Afghanistan under Article 51, still 
Caroline standards of necessity, proportionality and immediacy were not applied on 7 
October. The U.S. and U.K. objective changed on different scales considering the time 
limit, number of casualties, and removing the government of Afghanistan.    
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V. Security Council Role in the Aftermath of 11 September 
Attacks  
   According to Article 24 (1) of the United Nations Charter, Security Council is entitled 
with the maintenance of international peace and security.
397
 The reason why Bush 
administration knew the fact that his State’s response should be under an authorization 
from the Council. In this Chapter it will be examined whether the U.S. and U.K were 
justified to use force in Afghanistan on 7 October or not.  
A. The U.S. and U.K. Unilateral Response Justifications. 
   It was concluded in Chapter III that 1368 and 1373 Security Council resolutions did not 
characterize the attacks of 11 September as armed attacks which would trigger the U.S. 
right to act under Article 51 by using force against Afghanistan. However there are other 
arguments related to the Council could support the U.S. and U.K. attacks on 7 October. In 
this part it will be discussed that still both resolutions could constitute an authorization 
for both administrations to use force. Moreover, the letter by both administrations show 
that they followed the legal pattern presented in Article 51 that “measures taken by 
members…shall be immediately reported to the Security Council.” Moreover, the 
Council is the international body concerned with maintaining international peace and 
security, in the case when the U.S. and U.K. are breaching the law, it would impose that 
they are the aggressor States, which was not the case in 7 October. 
1. Security Council 1368, and 1373 Resolutions 
   It was mentioned in Chapter II that States have the right according to Article 51 to use 
force in response to an armed attack until the Council is sized with the matter. On 12 
September, the Council adopted 1368 resolution that draw the pattern of response on the 
terrorist attacks. It was mentioned before, in Chapter III, that it was seen as an implied 
authorization by the Council to the U.S. to use force when it stated that it recognizes “the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.”398 Moreover, in the negotiation 
prior to the adoption of the resolution, Mr. Cunningham on behalf of the U.S. suggested 
the actions, which probably will be followed by his government when called all States to 
“stand together with the United States to win the war against terrorism (emphasis 
added).”399 The statement by Mr. Cunningham in the negotiations prior to 1368 
resolution suggests another course of actions to the episode when it used the word “war.” 
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The Council’s more substantive response was drawn on 28 September in resolution 1373 
when it stated “the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts 
(emphasis added).”400 The resolution 1373 language could be read as an “almost 
unlimited mandate to use force.”401 Moreover it stated in the resolution that the Council 
expressed “its readiness to take all necessary steps” to deter terrorism, which also could 
be read as an implicit authorization to the U.S. to use armed force acting in self-
defense.
402
 It was argued that although both resolutions did not directly authorize the use 
of force, however, they still give an acceptable argument for the use of military actions in 
Afghanistan. Other authors such as Thomas Franck, argued that both resolutions 
authorized the U.S. to “use force against the Taliban, and they do so without creating a 
new set of self-defense laws.”403 Frank thinks that the authorization is well read in both 
resolutions language without the need to find other interpretations in the rules of self-
defense. However, both the U.S. and the U.K. did not rely on both resolutions when used 
force on 7 October in the Operation Enduring Freedom but still according to Michel 
Byers they provide both administrations with “at-least-tenable argument once they decide 
for political reasons to use force to prevent terrorism.”404  
2. U.S and U.K. letters to the Council on 7 October. 
   One of the main roles of the Council mentioned in Chapter II is that it should receive 
international forum from States acting in self-defense, considering the flow of the events, 
the cause of invoking self-defense, and evidence of responsibility of the aggressor 
State.
405
 According to the Council investigations to the evidence provided, it has the 
option whether to give “it’s retroactive…approval to the exercise of self-defense” by the 
State or it could decide that the State “engaged in…self-defense” is the aggressor State.406  
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   On 7 October, the U.S and U.K. reported their actions against Afghanistan in their letter 
to the Security Council. The U.S report stated that it was acting together with the U.K. 
under Article 51 “in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-
defense following the armed attacks that were carried out against the United States on 11 
September 2001.”407 The report stated that the U.S. has classified evidence of 
responsibility of al Qaeda and Taliban support of the 9/11 attacks. However, the U.S. did 
not state the exact evidence proofing the link between the attack and the terrorist 
organization. Bush in his speech refused to show evidence when stated that his demand 
“are not open to negotiation or discussion.”408 When asked again for evidence, the U.S. 
administration refused to show evidence as they were classified, it decided, “it was not 
necessary to make public its evidence against Mr. Bin Laden (emphasis added).”409 
Authors such as Dinstein, speaking generally and not on the U.S. war on Afghanistan, 
stated that even if evidence were classified they must be shown to the Security 
Council.
410
 He added that ambiguous evidence reported to the Council might create a 
“smokescreen” of the legality of any self-defense act.411 However, Judge Schwebel 
argued the issue of classified evidence in Nicaragua, clarifying that it’s not obligatory for 
States to public its evidence of measurements they follow in their acts of self-defense.
412
 
He said that measurements taken by States in self-defense might be “overt or covert.”413 
He added that covert actions also might not be reported to the Security Council, as the 
duty to report is just a procedural matter that does not “deprive a State of the substantive 
right of self defense.”414 Therefore, not supporting evidence on the responsibility of 9/11 
attacks in their reports to the Council is not a concrete proof of an illegal use of force by 
the U.S. or the U.K. in their attacks of 7 October 2001. It might be reasonable for the 
U.S. not to show evidence as it might affect its intelligence sources which could help in 
preventing further threats and attacks by terrorists.
415
 That was the case to the U.S. 
administrations when refused to show evidence as they were classified. 
3. The Council did not Condemn the U.S. and U.K use of force in Afghanistan 
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    The Security Council has the power, under the United Nations Charter, to consider 
whether the use of force by the U.S. and the U.K. is justified under self-defense or not. It 
could give its retroactive approval on the attack once it is satisfied with the legal grounds 
submitted by of both States.
416
 Also it could conclude that the attacks were illegal and 
demand the withdrawal of the forces engaged.
417
 The fact that the Council remained 
silence on the matter and did not condemn U.S. and U.K. attacks could be argued as an 
implicit agreement that the war was “legitimate exercise of self-defense.”418 If the 
Council did regard retroactively that the acts by both administrations are illegal under the 
United Nations Charter, it would have condemn them.
419
  Some authors such as Kirgis F, 
Israel’s Intensified Military Campaign against Terrorism, and Miller J, The Legal 
Implications of the Response to September 11, argued that the Councils “lack of 
response” is implied as an acceptance of the legality of self-defense.420 They added that 
although questions were raised considering the U.S. and U.K. tactics in the operation, 
governments did not challenge “the right of the United States to do so” which could be 
seen as an indication to the expansion of the right to self-defense to include “governments 
that harbor or support terrorist groups which commit armed attacks in other countries.”421 
Security Council reaction or negative response and governments reservations on 
commenting on the legality of the U.S. and U.K. attacks are argued as an implicit 
approval from the Council to their use of force under the United Nations Charter.  
B. The Security Council did not Authorize U.S. and U.K. Attacks on Afghanistan.      
   According to Article 51, States under an armed attack have the “inherent right of…self-
defense” to act without an authorization from any international official body.422 The 
requirements of an armed attack give the right for States to act even without the consent 
of the Security Council as they are left with “no plausible means short of military action” 
so they have no option but to repel the attack otherwise a serious damage will be caused 
if they waited.
423
 States in this phase are the first arbitrator for the legality of their acts; 
however, under Article 51, they have this right until the Security Council took “measures 
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necessary to maintain international peace and security.”424 Three points will be discussed 
in this part, first whether the Council in both resolution 1368 and 1373 authorized the 
“unilateral” use of force, secondly, if the report submitted by both States on 7 October 
justifies their attacks, and finally whether the Council silence is read as an agreement of 
both States attacks. 
1. Resolutions 1368 and 1373 Ordered a Response Led by the Security Council. 
   If the U.S. had the right to use force to act in self-defense after 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
this license ends once the Council is seized with the matter.
425
 Indeed, the Council 
showed its readiness to take measures following the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in both 
resolutions 1368 and 1373. Moreover, the Council, as the international body concerned 
under Article 39 for taking actions to restore peace, could decide whether military, 
diplomatic, or economic measures, could be taken by the U.S. in response to the attacks 
of 9/11.  As the international organ responsible for shaping the response, the Council 
adopted both resolutions that did not authorize the use of force, but drew a broad array of 
means when criminalized terrorist attacks, ordered freezing the support of terrorism, 
demanded exchanging police information, capture and prosecute terrorism.
426
 Therefore, 
in reading both resolutions, it could be understandable that the Council did not outline 
that the U.S. has the right to respond by using force in Afghanistan. According to 
Gregory Maggs, an American international law professor, he stated that the resolution did 
not “say what the right to self-defense entails… and it did not say that the United States 
had a right to act in self-defense in response to the attack by al Qaeda.”427 The Council 
did not stand silent in response, but ordered, according to both 1368 and 1373 
resolutions, measures other than unilateral military use of force.   
   According to what is stated in both resolutions 1368 and 1373, the council did not 
authorize the use of force and especially unilateral use of force.
428
 At the end of both 
resolutions, the Council decided to “remain seized of these matters.” Phyllis Bennis, a 
former United Nations correspondent, mentioned that according to “UN diplo speak” 
when the Council decides to remain seized with a certain matter it means that the 
“decision-making remains in the hands of the Council itself, not those of any individual 
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nation.”429 According to the language adopted in both resolutions on 12 and 28 
September, it is shown that the response remains in the hands of the Council. The 
resolutions show that since  terrorism is a threat to international peace and not only the 
U.S. but also all humanity, therefore the issue is in its “realm of responsibility.”430 Michel 
Byers observed that the Council did not legalize the use of force but “encouraging the US 
to seek authorization once its military plans were complete (emphasis added).”431 He 
means that the Council observed that the U.S. must take a further step when it uses force. 
This step should be requesting the authorization of the Security Council and its approval. 
Fredric Kirgis added that the Council “indicated that it intended to remain in charge of 
any use of force” when it expressed in the text of the resolutions its readiness to “take all 
necessary steps” in deterring international terrorism.432 The Council indicated that it is 
“ready to take further steps” but did not authorize States to take steps in unilateral 
response.
433
 In that sense the argument that the Council language is understand as an 
authorization to the U.S. to use unilateral force, is doubtful.  
   Moreover, it was argued that the Council intention was to act multilaterally in response 
to the episode.  When statements from Council members, in the negotiations prior to the 
adoption of resolution 1368, are observed, it is understandable that they requested a 
multilateral response led by the Security Council. Unlike the U.S. statement mentioned 
by Mr. Cunningham, other States members statements identified the attacks of 9/11 as an 
attack on all humanity, which calls the need for an “international, global, or multi-lateral 
response” led by the Council itself not by the U.S individually.434 States representatives 
stressed the criminality of the attacks and its affect on the humanity and called the need 
for s global response. In addition, United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, argued 
in favor of a multilateral response, when said on 24 September 2001 that the attacks of 
9/11 “was a blow, not against one city or one country” but attacks on all nations, he 
added that the response is to “build…a universal coalition [in order to] give global 
legitimacy to the long-term struggle against terrorism (emphasis added).”435 Kofi Annan 
                                                          
429
 Id. 
430
 MYRA WILLIAMSON, TERRORISM, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 297, (Alison Kirk ed., 
Elaine Coupe ed., Nikki Dines ed., Patrick Cole ed., University of Waikato New Zealand 2009) (2009) 
431
 MICHAEL BYERS, TERRORISM: THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AFTER 
SEPTEMBER 11, 401 (2010), 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5575&context=faculty_scholarship. 
432
 MYRA WILLIAMSON, TERRORISM, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 298, (Alison Kirk ed., 
Elaine Coupe ed., Nikki Dines ed., Patrick Cole ed., University of Waikato New Zealand 2009) (2009) 
433
 Id. 
434
 Id ,at 296. 
435 UN GAOR, A/56/PV.7, General Assembly 56th Session, 7th plenary session, 24 September 2001, 
Secretary General at 1. See also, Id at 299.   
77 
 
point was to call the nations, in addition to the U.S, to act under multilateral response 
coverage to deter the continuing struggle of terrorism.
436
  
   Comparing representative’s statements and the language of 1368 and 1373 resolution 
with the acts made by the U.S. on 7 October, it seems that there are gaps between the 
Council intention to act in a multilateral response and the U.S. unilateral response.
437
  
Government representatives speaks prior to the adoption of resolution 1368, Security 
Council intention understood in 1368 and 1373 resolutions, and Secretary General 
statement to the General Assembly shows that the Council’s response commensurate with 
the argument of multilateral response led by the Council as the 9/11 attacks were on all 
humanity and threaten international peace and security of all nations not just the U.S. 
Thus, U.S. lack authority to attack Afghanistan under the justification of Security Council 
resolutions. However, still the resolutions give the U.S. the right to obtain an 
authorization from the Council to use military force which would legitimize its act.
438
 
2. U.S. letter to the Council does not Justifies 7 October Attacks.  
   According to the United Nations Charter, a State using force under Article 51 has to 
submit a report to the Security Council, which describes a “minimum plain” reasoning of 
self-defense invocation and provides clear evidence connecting the Aggressor State to the 
attack and proof its responsibility.
439
 On 7 October U.S. reported its attack on 
Afghanistan when its representative to the Council stated, “[m]y Government has 
obtained clear and compelling information that the Al-Qaeda organization, which is 
supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in the attacks 
(emphasis added).”440 The U.S. representative recognized his State right to use force 
against Afghanistan under self-defense without clear evidence neither stated publicly in 
his letter nor submitted to the Council in a confidential way.
441
 It was argued in the 
previous part that the U.S. did not show evidence in its report to the Council as they were 
classified, however, if evidence could not be made fully public at least it must have been 
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submitted to the international official body concerned, the Security Council.
442
 The U.S. 
might be convinced with the evidence it has, however, others are not, evidence must have 
been shown whether to the Council or at least to a neutral State, to proof legitimacy of the 
attack. Arguing what was observed by Judge Schwebel, that States acting in self-defense 
have the option not to show their evidence as they might be “covert”, Dinstein said that 
nothing in the text of the Charter imposes limits to the duty of States to report only overt 
measurements, “limitations of the reporting duty to overt operations is not congruent with 
the Charter.”443 In other words, although confidential evidence might not be publicly 
shown, however, still the U.S. have the duty to submitted to the Council reasonable 
evidence of the 7 October attacks. It might be seen that the U.S. itself was not convinced 
with the evidence it has, as it escaped in more than an occasion the question of the 
evidence. 
   State when providing a report to the Council considering a claim to use force in 
exercising its right of self-defense does not mean the Council approval to that claim. 
Submitting a report to the Council does not guarantees that the claims stated in it will be 
accepted.
444
 The U.S. report on 7 October which stated that it was about to launch an 
armed attack on Afghanistan does not proof per se that the attacks were legitimate use of 
force, still an authorization from the Council to use that force is needed to consider its 
attacks as legitimate exercise of using force.
445
 
3. The Council Negative Response is not a Proof of the Legitimacy of the Attacks. 
   Not condemning the attacks of 9/11 whether by the Council or the States members does 
not suggests that the Council agreed that the attacks were legitimate and that the member 
have no reservations on the justification of the attacks.
446
 The Council was criticized for 
not making any clear announcement on the legality or illegality of the U.S. attacks on 
Afghanistan, however, the Council like the rest of the whole international community 
was affected by the profoundness and ugliness of the horrific 9/11 attacks.447 The Council 
kept the matter of justifying or avoiding an attack on Afghanistan vague, the climate at 
that time was an “overwhelming sympathy for the US and underwhelming sympathy for 
Afghanistan.”448 Moreover, even if States would have reservations considering the 
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legality of the attack, they would have not declared them. Any criticisms would have 
been viewed as an “anti-American” rather than “pro-international law” argument.449 
Christian Gray made an argument that the Council stays silent in the cases when there is 
one of the permanent members of veto states is involved.
450
 Sikander Ahmed Shah added 
that States abstained from condemning the attacks on Afghanistan as the fear of losing 
“privileges and assistance from the United States or economic and non-economic 
punitive retaliatory measures from the sole hegemonic power in the world.”451 Therefore, 
the somewhat “muted world response” on the legality of the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan 
7 October could not be viewed as a “passive acceptance” and support on the legality of 
the U.S. U.K. war.
452
 Moreover, the Council failure to note validity of the actions or 
condemn them retroactively, show the Council sympathy with the U.S. not its 
authorization for the war.
453
 No “definitive findings” on the legality of the U.S. U.K. 
attacks could be based on the Council actions or lack of reaction.
454
      
C. Conclusion. 
    According to resolutions 1368 and 1373, the Council is not authorizing a unilateral 
armed attack on Afghanistan. The U.S. when attacked Afghanistan it took advantage of 
the international widespread sympathy with the horrific attacks toward it on 11 
September 2001. In re-reading both resolutions, their language are closer to shaping the 
Council intent to a multilateral response in deterring terrorism threats led by it, not as an 
authorization for the U.S. to respond unilaterally. However, still the Council language 
argued as an encouragement to the U.S. to ask for a Security Council authorization to use 
force once its military plans are ready. The Council when stated that it “remain seized of 
this matters” shows its responsibility to draw forms of counter-actions to the episode, 
whether military, economic, or political. The shape of these counter-actions were seen in 
States representatives debate prior to the adoption of 1368 resolution which are contrary 
to the actions taken by the US. States called for the need for a global response led by the 
Council as the terrorist attacks were attacks on all humanity not only on the US. 
Moreover, multilateral response argument was stated directly in the General Assembly 
when the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan urged the need to build a universal coalition 
in order to fight terrorism as the attacks were on all humanity. It argued that the Secretary 
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General address was, however, after a realization that the U.S. will sideline the Security 
Council responding unilaterally without seeking for its sanctions.
455
     
   The 1368 and 1373 Security Council resolutions called all States to unify to deter 
terrorism by different means; police investigations, exchanging information or any other 
means “led by it” without authorizing a unilateral response by the U.S. on the State of 
Afghanistan. Though, there are confusions on what both resolutions “affirmatively” 
authorize.
456
 Generally speaking, if one might say that the language of both resolutions 
are not clear on what they directly authorize, still they are clear on what they do not 
authorize.
457
 Unlike what was said by Frank, the resolutions show no facts of a clear 
authorization for the U.S. to use force.
458
 
   Two points must be argued considering both the U.S. and U.K. letters to the Council on 
7 October. Firstly, is that the U.S. and the U.K. did not cite any evidence of responsibility 
on the attacks whether in their letters to the Council, 9/11 Commission Report, or HMG’s 
report. Secondly is that reporting to the Council is not a proof per se that the use of force 
was legitimate. The U.S. refused to show evidence to Afghanistan when it asked for, as 
they were classified, also it did not hand the evidence to the Security Council. The U.S. 
should have shown evidence, at least to the Council. The guilt of Afghanistan, which 
called for a use of force in an armed attack, should have been proven by “amassing of 
evidence.”459 Theses evidence, according to international law Article 51, should have 
been “immediately reported” to the Security Council or even to any “other appropriate 
international agencies.”460 The Council should determine punishments and means of 
implementations relying on the facts proven by the evidence submitted, even before the 
U.S. launches its attacks on 7 October.
461
 According to Article 39, the Council might 
subject Afghanistan, if satisfied with the evidence, to any punishments, whether measures 
not involving armed force such as political pressures, and economic coercion, or armed 
measures such as approving a military invasion by the US. In accordance with the weak 
evidence provided, Arab League, Islamic World, and the Council were not convinced 
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with the legality of the attacks. It seems that Washington is the only organ that was 
satisfied with this evidence.
462
 It seems that having no access to concrete intelligence 
sources to cite in its report was the reason why neither did the U.S. seek an authorization 
from the Security Council nor submitted this evidence to any international body.
463
      
   The world silence cannot be considered as a passive acceptance of the war on 
Afghanistan. Although the Council and other States had reservations on the U.S. attacks, 
they could not explicitly show them, as they might be seen as contradicting the U.S. 
interests in securing its own nation and people after the 9/11 grave attacks. They were 
affected also by the climate of sympathy followed the attacks.
464
 The fear of losing 
privileges given by the U.S. was the reason why governments did not accuse the U.S. 
attacks on Afghanistan. Moreover, the Council when condemn 9/11 attacks could be 
compared to what was stated by Lobel J on 1998 after the U.S. missiles strike on Sudan 
and Afghanistan, he said that “any direct confrontation between the Security Council and 
the United States…is certain to fail.”465 The U.S. policy is clear, he said, “[i]t will veto 
any resolution calling for an investigation into the attack.”466 
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VI. Conclusion 
   When international law provisions, including the United Nations Charter, customary 
law, ICJ’s rulings, and general principles, are applied to the October 7 2001 U.S.-U.K. 
military response in the territory of Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, it can be concluded that these attacks were unlawful. States have the right to use 
force under two circumstances, neither of which was found in the US-UK war. These two 
circumstances include using force in self-defense after being subject to an armed attack, 
and obtaining authorization by the Security Council. Although the U.S. justified its use of 
force as an application of its inherent right to self-defense in its letter to the Council, the 
acts were still not legitimate for three main reasons.  
   First, on the day of 11 September 2001, the U.S. was not exposed to an “armed attack” 
under the comprehensive definition of Article 51 of the Charter, which would have given  
it the right to use force in self-defense. The U.S. claimed that Taliban were responsible 
since they “harbor” al Qaeda. However, according to Nicaragua test, in order to count the 
Taliban government responsible for al Qaeda, it must have an “effective control” over the 
operation of 9/11, supporting arms, or providing safe-haven do not amount to an armed 
attack. The U.S. did not prove the Taliban’s effective control on the attacks rather it 
stated in the letter to the Council that it had a “central role” and supported al Qaeda in the 
attacks. If the U.S. could provide evidence of a direct connection between al Qaeda and 
Taliban, as the latter supported the former with weapons, training, or safe harboring, 
Afghanistan might have been considered responsible for a mere use of force or 
aggression as it violated the prohibition stated in Article 2 (4). Nevertheless, it could not 
be responsible for an armed attack on the U.S., which gives it the right under Article 51 
to use force in self-defense. 
   Second, according to the U.S. letter to the Council, assuming that it suffered an armed 
attack on 9/11 which gives it the right to act according to Article 51 to “prevent and deter 
further attacks” or according to the U.K. argument to “avert the continuing threat of 
attacks from the same source”, still the U.S. is bound by the customary law requirements 
to act in legal anticipatory self-defense. The U.S. failed to meet necessity, 
proportionality, and immediacy self-defense requirements when it attacked Afghanistan 
on 7 October. The attacks were not necessary- there were other options available to the 
U.S. and U.K., such as a police investigation, extradition, or diplomatic negotiations. 
Moreover, the U.S. attacks did not include the proportionate objectives of self-defense 
which was seen in the waiver of the Afghani government or the extension in time of the 
attack. The evidence showed that the U.S. attempt to end the dispute peacefully was not 
serious. Moreover, to attack another territory in anticipatory self-defense, the threat must 
be imminent and based on concrete evidence supported to the Council. The U.S. letter to 
the Council referred to evidence of the Taliban’s support and intent to commit future 
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attacks, however, it did not submit them to any international official body. The evidence 
of both the U.S. and U.K of an imminent Taliban threat were questionable as they were 
gathered by torturing prisoners. The U.S. and U.K. attacked Afghanistan under the 
argument of self-defense as it formed an overwhelming threat, however, it did not satisfy 
customary law requirements. The only threat seemed to be from terrorists inside the U.S. 
territory, and there was no necessity to go bomb Afghanistan, as there was no evidence to 
prove future threats by it. 
   Finally, although the Security Council declared in both resolutions 1368 and 1373 that 
the 9/11 attacks were threats to international peace and security, it did not authorize the 
U.S. to use force in self-defense against Afghanistan. Moreover, the U.S. and U.K. 
reports to the Council, were not  proof per se of the legality of their attack, and yet still 
the Council must have clearly authorized them to use force. The Council language in both 
resolutions called for a multilateral response led by the Council, and not a unilateral 
attack by the U.S. However, the Council gave the U.S. the opportunity to call for an 
authorization once its military plans were ready. Although the U.S. did not argue that the 
Security Council resolutions justified its use of force, still the attacks should be 
considered illegal, as the Council did not authorize them.   
 
 
     
              
         
  
